The Rise of China Until 2030: How Much Will It Rise, and How Much Will the U.S. Hold On?

The US was viewed as a state with striking economic growth and geopolitical ambition for a long time. Yet, it was reluctant to confront the reality that the world order might shift from a unipolar to a multipolar moment. Many analysts predicted that momentum would emerge as China's strength surged during the 2008 financial crisis, particularly during the COVID-19 epidemic. In contrast to the United States, which was forming alliances, boasting of technological advancements like artificial intelligence, and enjoying a thriving economy with record-low unemployment and record-high stock markets, Beijing was surprisingly beset by ominous demographics, youth unemployment that had never been imagined, and deepening stagnation.

At that time, the United States greeted this news with overconfidence. However, caution is advised until the outcome is confirmed: Measured at market exchange rates, China's GDP now exceeds 70 percent of that of the United States. However, in terms of purchasing power better reflects real economic weight—China's economy is already about 20percent larger. China has double the production capability. Technologically, it controls everything from electric automobiles to fourth-generation nuclear reactors, and it currently generates more active patents and highly referenced scientific articles each year. Militarily, it boasts the world's biggest fleet, supported by a shipbuilding capacity 200 times that of the United States, substantially larger missile stores, and the world's most sophisticated hypersonic capabilities—all the consequence of history's quickest military upgrade. 

Washington and Beijing are now breathing down each other’s necks in almost every domain of global power. How they manage their relations until 2030 will undoubtedly leave a lasting impact on the international order. 

In the years ahead, the world is likely to be shaped by how high China climbs—and how well the US holds its ground. This piece looks closer at where the balance of power might be headed by 2030, comparing both giants across five key fronts: the economy, politics, the military, society, and technology. The real question? Whether we're entering a Chinese century, or watching a superpower showdown that's far from over.

Economic Dimension 

China Controls the Hardware. The World Feels It.

For all the talk of software, platforms, and AI, the world still runs on hardware, and China owns the lion's share of it. From the minerals inside advanced chips to the magnets that power electric vehicles and missiles, the global economy relies on materials that most countries can't source without Beijing. What was once seen as China's industrial base is now a strategic asset, weaponised through policy and protected by scale. This isn't just a supply chain story—it's a story of power. Currently, that power is concentrated in China.  

China's near-monopoly on rare earths gives it enormous leverage in the global technology economy. It mines about 70 per cent of the world's rare earth metals, performs 90 per cent of the chemical processing, and produces roughly 90 per cent of the magnets used in everything from smartphones to electric vehicles and modern weapons. Chinese refineries account for up to 99.9 per cent of the global supply for certain critical elements, such as dysprosium and terbium. This domination influences the direction and pace of global innovation, in addition to controlling resources.

The repercussions were immediate in April 2025 when Beijing imposed export restrictions on magnets in response to US tariff increases. When Ford ran out of the magnets required to produce electric vehicles (EVs), it was forced to close its facility in Chicago. European manufacturers halted production lines. Defence contractors began issuing warnings. What once seemed like an abstract vulnerability became a hard industrial ceiling. These weren't just supply chain disruptions but reminders of strategic dependence.

China isn't just scaling up—it's locking in dominance. By 2030, it's projected to control 45 per cent of global manufacturing. This isn't accidental. Beijing recently launched a $138 billion venture capital fund targeting AI, quantum technology, and robotics—high-stakes investments with long-term geopolitical payoff. It already leads in steel, batteries, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and pharmaceuticals. BYD, once mocked by Elon Musk, has surpassed Tesla and now ranks ahead of Ford, GM, and Volkswagen in market value.

Adjusted for purchasing power, China's GDP is already about 20 per cent larger than that of the United States. Its manufacturing capacity is twice that of its competitors. UN forecasts suggest that this gap will widen further: by 2030, China is expected to account for 35 per cent of global manufacturing output, compared to just 11 per cent for the US. Crucially, this isn't confined to legacy sectors—China now produces over two-thirds of the world's electric vehicles, more than 75 per cent of global battery output, and 80 per cent of all solar panels. Beijing is shaping the foundations of the worldwide energy transition, embedding leverage into the structure of green growth itself.

While China forges ahead with long-term economic planning and industrial modernisation, the U.S. economy under Trump’s second term is marked by short-termism and volatility. The chaotic rollout of tariffs and shifting policies has rattled consumer and business confidence, triggered front-loaded spending sprees, and contributed to a surprise decline in GDP. In contrast, China continues to project a stable economic trajectory, leveraging state control to avoid sudden shocks and unpredictable reversals. As American businesses hoard goods and brace for higher costs, Chinese firms benefit from a more predictable policy landscape and sustained government support, helping them navigate global markets. At the same time, the U.S. economy stumbles under the weight of self-inflicted uncertainty.

America's Retreat from Clean Tech

The United States had a chance to catch up, but Trump pulled the plug. After returning to power, his administration quickly suspended the Inflation Reduction Act—a $369 billion industrial strategy to scale clean technology industries, including solar, wind, carbon capture, and electric vehicles. This wasn't just about climate—it was a blueprint for regaining industrial strength.

However, Trump's second-term agenda has moved the US in the opposite direction. His government has resorted to coercive measures rather than strengthening international ties, threatening tariffs, enforcing harsh trade restrictions, and even suggesting that Canada become the "51st state."  This strategy has strained ties and caused supply chain instability rather than enhancing American competitiveness. His trade wars have narrowed US market access and disrupted production for firms expected to compete globally. The Ford plant closure was just the beginning.

The rare earth shortages are more than a temporary setback—they're the product of deep structural problems. While China has spent decades building dominance across the entire value chain—from raw materials to refined technologies—the United States has allowed its industrial base to hollow out. As Andrew Chivvis has noted, the US suffers from decades of incoherent industrial policy, chronic underinvestment in R&D, and political whiplash that leaves strategic industries without long-term support.

The result is a vulnerability that touches nearly every critical sector—defence, energy, and transportation. It's not just about what China controls. It's about what the US has failed to build.

The Reality of Interdependence

Yet, for all the nationalist rhetoric and threats of decoupling, both economies remain deeply entangled. Hundreds of billions of dollars in trade still flow between them every year. Dismantling these interdependencies will not be cheap or easy. It will require reshoring production, forging new global partnerships, and mobilising substantial capital to build resilient alternatives. Decoupling is not a switch—it's a generation-long project.

This rivalry isn't going anywhere. If anything, it's intensifying. While China already dominates clean tech, batteries, and high-value manufacturing, economic architecture may be the next frontier. Will China surpass the US in nominal GDP? Not tomorrow—but it's closing in fast, especially adjusted for purchasing power. Will it lead the global financial system? Not yet—but Beijing is internationalising the renminbi, constructing alternative trade networks, and offering a governance model free from liberal-democratic preconditions.

The United States now faces a choice: reinvest in its industrial and scientific edge or continue down the path of tariffs, retreat, and unpredictability. While Trump views trade wars and tech bans as short-term leverage, the real contest is over who will write the rules of the global economy in 2030—and right now, China is playing the long game.

Political Power and Global Influence

China's Domestic Governance & International Influence 

While Xi-style authoritarianism prevails today, it may evolve into a more pragmatic dimension as a defence mechanism for domestic survival and development. The future leaders, today's Chinese Generation Z, still will not be pro-Western democrats, though. They may be more stable, realistic, and open to forming a global role that does not require repression at home or aggression abroad.

The Chinese governance model is best understood as pragmatic authoritarianism — a willingness to adjust tactics when necessary as long as control is maintained. Under Xi, we have seen a tightening of the top-down command system, characterised by increased surveillance, censorship, and ideological conformity. But this rigidity creates its pressures. As economic growth slows and public discontent simmers beneath the surface, the party may be forced to evolve–not ideologically, but operationally.

Looking ahead to 2030, we expect a more technocratic style of governance to emerge. Domestically, this could mean loosening controls in some areas, for example, giving local governments more room to innovate or allowing limited public feedback on non-political issues while maintaining tight controls on freedom of speech, dissent, and national identity. We may see more digital governance, AI-driven public services, and climate-friendly infrastructure projects.

The Political Trajectory of the United States (2025–2030) 

Under Trump's second term, the idea of America as the moral backbone of the international system has all but vanished. The postwar narrative of the US as the "leader of the free world" has been replaced by something far more transactional — a worldview where power, not principle, dictates behaviour. Trump now portrays America as just one powerful guy among many, making deals and changing international laws to fit his goals rather than defending democracy or advancing liberal ideals. This change signifies a retreat from the liberal international order and the notion that anything greater than the United States is the source of American strength. 

What's left in its place is a kind of 21st-century "Concert of Autocrats." Trump seeks alignment not with democratic allies but with authoritarian heavyweights like Putin and Xi, sidelining multilateralism and values-based leadership. The problem is, this collusive order doesn't replace the liberal one — it hollows it out, creating a power vacuum that emerging middle powers and the restless public are unlikely to tolerate for long. What was once a system grounded in ideals is now governed by the whims of strongmen. The cost? A shrinking sphere of US political influence, as credibility erodes and alliances fray under the weight of abandoned commitments. 

Trump no longer sees America's role as defending democracy or promoting liberal values but simply as one strong man among many, making deals and reshaping global rules to suit his ambitions. This shift signals a shift away not only from the liberal international order but also from the idea that US power comes from something greater than itself.

Instead, it has been replaced by a 21st-century "Concert of Autocrats." Trump is not looking for an alliance with democratic allies but with authoritarian heavyweights like Putin and Xi, putting multilateralism and values-based leadership on the back burner. As a result, the sphere of US political influence will shrink significantly as trust falls. Trump's worldview is not just a retreat from liberal leadership. Still, it is reshaping the global playing field in a way that normalises illiberalism, making a return to principled US engagement much more difficult, even in future administrations.

The validity of American democracy and national unity are in danger due to a growing generational disenchantment, according to a recent Harvard Youth Poll. Sixty-one per cent of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 say they are more afraid than optimistic about the future of their nation, according to the Spring 2025 study. A glaring lack of faith in political institutions exacerbates this widespread anxiety: just 19% of people believe that the federal government consistently acts in their best interests, with Congress and the presidency coming in at 18% and 23%, respectively. These numbers highlight the growing divide between young Americans and the democratic institutions that are supposed to serve them.  

One political party is not the only one seeing a decline in confidence. While congressional Republicans maintain a stable but lacklustre 29% popularity rating, congressional Democrats' approval ratings have fallen from 42% in 2017 to only 23% in 2025. Youth's general perception of the political system as being inattentive and self-serving is reflected in this nonpartisan disenchantment. The fundamental democratic idea of representation is questioned, as over half of young Americans believe they do not influence the choices made by the government. The rising disengagement of this generation seriously threatens the resiliency and survival of American democracy as they deal with social injustices, economic instability, and ecological threats. 

Such striking numbers might evoke population and cause civic disengagement by 2030. If Trump’s administration continues its politics in the way it looks today, we might see a massive wave of political instability within the United States. It might not necessarily evolve into the revolution or the Capitol attack like it used to be in January 2021, but in a constitutional way through the midterm elections in November 2026. Hopefully, a year and a half from now, the world will remain more or less resilient without the urgent changes. 

The United States stands at a transformative crossroads today, much like the world of 1945 following World War II. As the historian of 2100 might recount, the 2020s will not be remembered for the noise of daily headlines but for a profound structural reckoning with the systems that underpin American dominance for nearly a century. The dismantling of the Pax Americana and the bureaucratic welfare state under Trump is already well underway, driven by a mix of populist fury, unsustainable defence spending, and rising debt. But rather than delivering coherent reform, this phase has been defined by chaos — tariffs based on outdated logic, sweeping attacks on institutions, and a political strategy designed more for disruption than design. This "wrecking ball" politics, while breaking the inertia of the 50/50 political stalemate, also leaves America internally fractured and institutionally weakened at a time when global leadership demands coherence, credibility, and trust.

In this moment of instability, the US struggles to "hold on" globally because of external pressures from rising powers like China and its unresolved domestic fractures. Leadership, once rooted in liberal values and long-term alliances, now appears transactional, brittle, and reactive. However, the historical arc suggested by this piece is not all bleak. The chaotic dismantling of old systems — including military overreach, bloated bureaucracies, and ideological gridlock — may create something new. Just as the Great Depression and World War II paved the way for a generation of progressive reinvention, the 2030s could witness a similar rebuilding. If Trumpism marks the end of a failing political paradigm, it could also trigger the rise of a 60/40 coalition that finally delivers modern, inclusive, forward-looking governance. The tragedy is that, in this interregnum, American global influence shrinks precisely as China scales up, cohesive, ambitious, and increasingly capable of filling the void.

While the Trump administration has doubled down on security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific — expanding joint military exercises, relocating missile systems, and reinforcing defence partnerships — these moves are increasingly undermined by contradictions in broader US policy. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth emphasised that the administration is committed to strengthening military ties with regional partners to deter China. However, this security-first strategy coexists with a detrimental diplomatic and economic stance that undermines confidence among America's allies. Regional supply chains have been disrupted, and economic ties have been strained due to Trump's extensive tariff campaigns, which also impact important allies like South Korea. A key Aspect of Long-Term strategic relationships has also been further undermined by stringent immigration policies, such as the suspension of visa interviews for international students, which have hindered cultural and educational interactions. 

This disconnect between defence policy and broader diplomatic engagement is creating mixed signals. While regional allies like Australia, the Philippines, and Japan may welcome increased US military presence and capacity-sharing, they are also recalibrating their expectations of the United States as a reliable long-term partner. These nations may feel pressured to diversify their alliances to protect themselves against US unpredictability, as the US prioritises short-term political benefits over long-term relationship management. Analysts caution that military cooperation may be in jeopardy due to the weakening of soft power and economic ties. Without consistent and values-based leadership, America's strategy risks becoming a hollow alliance model that wields hard power while losing the trust and goodwill necessary for long-term regional stability.

Comparison & Outlook

In the evolving contest between China and the United States over the future of global governance, China is increasingly presenting itself as a viable alternative to the liberal international order that the United States has long championed. As Andrew Chivvis observes, China is "offering a real alternative to the U.S.-led international order," rooted in state sovereignty and non-interference principles. This model resonates particularly with authoritarian and non-aligned regimes wary of Western liberalisation and human rights demands. China's assertive efforts to "reshape multilateral institutions" — such as the UN, WHO, and regional development banks — reflect its ambition to reorient global norms to prioritise regime stability, territorial integrity, and development without Western conditionalities.

In contrast, the US has seen significant volatility in its global leadership role. The Trump administration's retreat from multilateralism — through tariff wars, withdrawal from international agreements, and a transactional approach to diplomacy — undermined trust among traditional allies and weakened the appeal of the rules-based order it once led. While the Biden administration has made efforts to re-engage with international institutions more pragmatically, this re-engagement has lacked the visionary energy that once defined US leadership. As a result, many countries, particularly in the Global South, may find China's model — stable, non-intrusive, and focused on development — more attractive in the short term, even if it lacks democratic ideals. The global battle for influence hinges not only on power projection but also on which system can offer a more coherent and dependable future.

While Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stressed America's continued security commitments in the Indo-Pacific during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, many experts warn that US trade policies are sending a conflicting message. Trump's harsh tariffs and lack of focus on economic cooperation have concerned key allies, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. These countries continue to support collaboration with the US, but they're starting to doubt whether they can rely on Washington as a stable economic partner.

Mira Rapp-Hooper, a former official at the National Security Council, explained that US trade decisions—such as broad tariffs and cancelling student visas—don't align with the needs or realities of its allies. The notion that the US can set the rules for economic partnerships on its own and then re-enter whenever it chooses is damaging trust in US cooperation and pulling back, challenging it. As the US sends mixed messages or pulls back, China steps in. While US tariffs disrupt trade, Beijing seizes the opportunity to expand its economic influence, particularly in the Global South and parts of Asia. Countries unsure about depending on the US find China's steady trade and investment offers more attractive. Through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and new trade deals, China presents itself as a consistent partner, one that doesn't attach the same political or protectionist conditions that now often come with US involvement. The more the US weakens its economic ties, the more China fills the gap, offering money and a sense of stability that many countries are eager to accept.

Military modernisation and Strategy

China's military modernisation is outpacing that of the United States in critical ways. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is already the world's largest navy by vessel count and is expected to grow by over 100 vessels within just five years. By 2027, its fleet will be around 30% larger than the US Navy's, with vertical launch system (VLS) missile capacity likely to exceed that of the United States.

This isn't just about shipbuilding numbers — capability and pace. China's shipbuilding industry is 200 times the size of America's, and it is coupling that industrial might with advanced missile systems, including the world's most expansive stockpile of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles. Perhaps even more concerning, China is pulling ahead in hypersonic weaponry and naval firepower, translating industrial dominance into operational advantage. The US retains a qualitative edge in areas such as aviation and global force projection. Still, it risks losing that lead unless it adapts to a world where quantity—backed by innovation and scale—has a quality all its own. This underscores the need for a strategic pivot from unilateralism toward integrated allied defence capacity, as any prolonged conflict would expose the limitations of the defence-industrial base on its own. 

Meanwhile, the US spent $997 billion on defence in 2024, more than the combined military spending of the next nine highest-spending nations, which included China, Russia, and India. This substantial expenditure shows its commitment to maintaining a robust military presence worldwide. However, it also raises concerns about fiscal sustainability, especially as defence spending is projected to decline as a share of GDP, from 2.9% in 2025 to 2.4% by 2035, while interest payments on the national debt are increasing. The amount of money the United States spends on defence reflects its strategic goals, which include supporting allies, investing in cutting-edge technology, and maintaining a global military presence. However, this amount of spending also sparks discussions over long-term fiscal health and resource allocation. 

Although the United States spends more on defence than any other country, the Congressional Budget Office projects that defence spending as a share of gross domestic product will decline over the coming years, from 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 2.4 per cent in 2035. That is proportionately lower than the 50-year average level of defence spending, which is 4.2 per cent of GDP. 

If the US is ruled by sufficiency, sufficiency takes over China. Are the arms races between these two something to be concerned about? Let’s dig it deeper. 

Risk of U.S.-China Military Conflict

China's military build-up—marked by massive investments in naval capabilities, hypersonic weapons, cyber warfare, and space systems—is often interpreted as preparation for a possible conflict over Taiwan. However, as Rana Mitter underscores, the risk of military escalation might counter China's broader strategic interests. A violent takeover of Taiwan, while technically possible, would come at a devastating cost: it would wreck China's soft power, trigger heavy sanctions from the Global North, upend supply chains, and invite regional militarisation. In this light, China's military modernisation by 2030 may be more about deterrence than actual warfare. 

China's ambitions for regional dominance are reinforced by what Chivvis describes as a "comprehensive military modernisation effort" focused on denying the United States reliable access to the western Pacific. This strategy, often called "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD), encompasses advanced missile systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and a growing naval fleet designed to limit the US's freedom of movement in strategically crucial areas. The goal is clear: make US intervention, especially in a Taiwan contingency, so costly and complex that Washington may hesitate to act.

From the perspective of US defence officials like Secretary Pete Hegseth, China's rise is no longer seen as a distant concern. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth repeatedly framed China as a revisionist power, accusing it of seeking "hegemonic" control over the Asia-Pacific region. His message was blunt: China's military expansion, rapid technological advances, and aggressive posture in regional disputes — particularly over Taiwan — indicate competition and a challenge to the existing security order. However, the core fear isn't just that China seeks influence — it's that it seeks control. As Hegseth put it, the US does not aim to "strangle" or "provoke" China, but it won't stand by while Beijing tries to redraw the map of regional power.

Security Dilemma 

While the recently restored regular military dialogue mechanisms between the US and China provide opportunities to discuss incidents, they have not proven robust enough to prevent them. China's increasingly aggressive military behaviour is a significant catalyst for these incidents. Still, the US policy of "sailing, flying, and acting where international law permits" is an open challenge, as it all occurs within a few dozen miles of its coast. In response to the Defence Department's disclosure of dangerous interceptions of US and allied aircraft over the past two years, the Chinese Ministry of Defence stated that the United States had conducted 2,000 air operations and numerous naval operations near China. Even if this Chinese figure is exaggerated, there are reasons for dialogue and the adoption of road rules to reduce the number of dangerous incidents.

Taiwan remains the most likely cause of war with China, including teetering on the brink of nuclear war. Under the Trump and Biden administrations, US policy toward Taiwan has shifted as Beijing's military capabilities have grown, making the risk of a war of choice more plausible. Since 2019, China has effectively remilitarised the status quo in Taiwan, and air and naval operations around the island—primarily in international airspace and waters—have become a near-daily occurrence. Calls for the United States to shift from a policy of strategic ambiguity to one of strategic clarity with a clearly defined combat commitment to defend Taiwan risk falling into the trap of containment, in which reciprocal actions to demonstrate power deepens the security dilemma, thereby causing the very crisis that such a shift is intended to prevent.

Can China Achieve Military Parity with the US by 2030?

There is a rare moment of bipartisan consensus in U.S.-China relations: while trade wars, technological disconnects, and ideological narratives fluctuate, the U.S. defence posture in Asia remains essentially unchanged. Despite changes in leadership and tone, both Democratic and Republican administrations have backed efforts to counter China's growing military strength, particularly around Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing is building its naval capabilities, investing in artificial intelligence-based warfare, expanding its nuclear arsenal, and aggressively projecting power into disputed waters.

While full military parity by 2030 remains unlikely, the momentum is clearly on Beijing's side. The fundamental question is whether this trajectory will lead to outright confrontation or a tense yet stable balance of power. In any case, the military dimension is shaping up to be the most stable ( most dangerous) arena in US-China relations. As the two powers grow stronger, deterrence, rather than diplomacy, may become the defining language of their future.

Social Cohesion and National Stability

China's social policy challenges are significant: An ageing population, rising debt, stagnant productivity, rising housing risks, high youth unemployment, and a crackdown on the private sector. However, their strategic importance is often overstated. For example, its demographic challenges will be a serious problem in the long term, but they are manageable in the medium term. China's dependency ratio (adult workers to children and retirees) is expected to remain lower than Japan's current rate through 2050. Massive investments in education, industrial robotics, and embedded artificial intelligence will help China overcome its labour shortage. 

However, the Chinese government has its dark side: censorship and persecution. One disturbing example is its policy towards Hong Kong. When Hong Kong was handed over from British control to Chinese rule in 1997, Beijing promised to preserve its capitalist system and grant it a high degree of autonomy under the "one country, two systems" principle. However, over time, Beijing has systematically eroded these freedoms. A significant turning point was the enactment of the National Security Law in 2020, which made acts considered terrorism, subversion, secession, and coordination with foreign powers illegal. Pro-democracy campaigners have been arrested, opposition has been repressed, and the legislation has curtailed press and speech freedoms. In 2024, Beijing tightened its belt even further. China has never proclaimed itself a democracy, but it is clear that some of its policies cross the line and infringe on human dignity and life, which should be the main characteristics not only of a democratic regime but also of common sense. 

Across the Pacific Ocean, Trump's America is characterised by growing ideological and cultural division. The former president's alliance with right-wing religious and cultural conservatives, who frequently repeat Russian traditionalist narratives, has made divisions over immigration, race, LGBTQ+ rights, and reproductive freedom worse. This fuels an exclusionary "us vs. them" mentality and cultivates a post-liberal vision of society in which pluralism is viewed with suspicion, diversity is perceived as a threat, and national unity depends on a narrow, homogeneous notion of American identity. America's soft power is being eroded by the deterioration of democratic values, which makes it more challenging to maintain partnerships and less appealing to a worldwide audience that formerly respected its dedication to freedom and inclusiveness. Instead of values-based leadership, Trump's transactional foreign policy reinforces perceptions that the United States is unreliable and selfish, prioritising short-term deals over long-term principles. Domestically, the consequences are equally dire: nationalism and isolationism fuel scepticism about multilateral institutions, while populist rhetoric delegitimises democratic institutions, portraying them as tools of corrupt elites. As public trust erodes and polarisation deepens, the United States becomescohesive and more vulnerable on the world stage—socially fragmented at home and strategically diminished abroad.

But how did the majority choose this path, given our familiar image of the United States as the epitome of liberalism? In his piece "Is America a Myth?" historian David Blight considers the persistent story of American exceptionalism and its increasing inconsistency with modern reality. Systemic issues, including social fragmentation, political polarisation, and income disparity, threaten the myths of freedom, equality, and togetherness. These challenges have led to a reassessment of American identity and its promise. Economic inequality has undermined faith in the American Dream; partisan divisions and institutional failures have fueled political distrust; society has become more vulnerable to fragmentation as social resilience weakens—the list goes on.

The backlash against Chinese students

What further isolates America today is the strengthening of its migration policy. Trump's administration recently announced an «aggressive» revocation of visas for Chinese students with ties to the Chinese Communist Party or for those studying in broadly defined "critical fields." Additionally, the administration intends to improve the screening process by enhancing the student visa application process, including examining social media profiles. However, these laws are so general that the government cannot distinguish between those genuinely seeking educational opportunities and those posing security risks. However, China is grateful for the new Trump policy and treats it as a distinguished gift: Even before the US threatened to bar international students and besieged universities, China's massive spending campaign on the sciences is already yielding wins in its rivalry with the United States for scientific talent. 

Which society is more resilient to internal disruption?

China positions its political model as more stable and effective than the United States, particularly during times of crisis. The Chinese Communist Party promotes the stability and effectiveness of centralised government, arguing that it is better suited to coping with long-term issues and unexpected disruptions. For example, amid global economic uncertainty, the CCP has demonstrated its ability to maintain social order and control financial resources from the top down, bolstering the notion that its system can deliver stability without the gridlock of democratic politics. 

Beijing does not export a codified ideology akin to communism. Instead, it promotes what Chivvis calls "non-ideological authoritarianism"—a technocratic, results-oriented model that resonates with countries seeking economic development without liberal reforms. Its meritocratic and centralised system is better equipped to navigate uncertainty and project a long-term national vision. This perception of authoritarian resilience is central to how China distinguishes itself from the democratic model, and it is a challenge that the United States must grapple with not only abroad but also by addressing its vulnerabilities at home.

At the heart of China's complex governance model is what is known as "authoritarian welfarism"—a political model that combines top-down control with substantial social investment aimed at ensuring stability, reducing inequality, and achieving material progress. This model may become increasingly attractive to countries in the Global South and even parts of the West, especially as liberal democracies seem mired in dysfunction and inequality. In contrast, the United States continues to call itself the world's champion of democracy, yet it faces deep internal crises and is stuck in a dead end.

Technological Innovation and Digital Power

China is rapidly building a network of interconnected technology ecosystems spanning robotics, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence, which is the foundation of its ambitions to lead the 21st-century world order. Rather than relying solely on individual innovations, Beijing is developing a "virtuous cycle" of state-owned technological development, where progress in one sector reinforces advances in others. A prime example is the recent launch of DeepSeek, a generative artificial intelligence system. At the same time, China is making unprecedented strides in semiconductor manufacturing, as exemplified by Huawei's breakthrough in developing a 7nm chip despite US export controls and in industrial robotics, where its factories now deploy more automation systems annually than any other country.

China's technological rise is not simply a case of rapid growth; it results from focused state governance. Chivvis calls it an "effective model of technonationalism," in which the state actively manages innovation, allocates funding, and sets strategic priorities. China is already a leader in facial recognition systems, social credit infrastructure, and smart city surveillance networks, many of which are exported to regimes seeking digital control without democratic accountability. Through projects like the Digital Silk Road, Beijing is imposing its technological standards across the Global South, building digital infrastructure and dependency.

The escalating trade war between the United States and China reveals a crucial truth of our time: national security and industrial innovation are now inextricably intertwined. As both countries block access to critical technologies, they are not simply protecting their industries but preparing for a future where economic advantage underpins military might. For Washington, the logic is clear: restricting access to American semiconductors and aerospace parts is a way to hinder China's drive for self-reliance in critical sectors, such as aviation and artificial intelligence. But Beijing's counter-move—stopping exports of rare earth elements—shows that it also views innovation and materials as leverage on the broader security chessboard. These tit-for-tat restrictions are shaping what has been called "supply chain warfare," where economic tools become direct extensions of state power. Suppose either side misjudges its leverage or overreaches. In that case, the consequences extend beyond trade—they can disrupt entire defence supply chains, stall critical innovation, and even increase the risk of military miscalculation. This is not just a technology race—it's a contest over who controls the building blocks of modern power.

China's Innovation & Tech Ecosystem

China is not just a producer of hardware but a normative tech power capable of reshaping global governance. As liberal pluralist democracy potentially becomes a "minority taste" by the 2030s, Mitter suggests that China may lead in green technology and AI-assisted governance, forming parallel technological ecosystems that challenge Western dominance. This shift isn't merely about economic clout—it's about soft power: China is exporting partnerships, infrastructure, and political models that promise stability and prosperity without requiring democratic reforms. But simultaneously let’s not underestimate Western technological progress, particularly with the foundational AI models that are racing with the Chinese ones–at least for now, we still shouldn’t rush to conclusions and watch whose side will become outstanding soon. 

Central to this vision is China's ability to adapt technology to its authoritarian but efficient governance model. Surveillance, planning tools, and digital control mechanisms are becoming increasingly advanced, enabling China to appear  and organised. This plea may resonate with countries seeking rapid progress amid global turmoil. However, Mitter warns that this highly centralised efficiency may become a limitation, restricting innovation, openness, and worldwide trust. As China uses technology to govern and project influence, it must also confront the reality that rigid authoritarian systems are vulnerable to stagnation and backlash. Thus, China's bid for 21st-century leadership may succeed through its material capacity and ability to shape global aspirations via authoritarian welfarism. This political alternative blends control with public goods.

US Technology is Under the Huge Wave of Stress

While the United States once attracted the world's brightest minds and offered research funding, academic freedom, and career advancement, the intellectual community is now seeking alternative opportunities for its development. The Trump administration's policies have alienated many scholars, especially Chinese scholars, by cutting research budgets and launching criminal investigations against researchers of Chinese descent. Undoubtedly, China is only rubbing its hands together and happily welcoming back its smart compatriots into its arms. Universities such as Westlake and Tsinghua now offer competitive salaries, state-of-the-art laboratories, and support that once could only be found in the West. Scientists who once helped build the USUSUS research engine are now accepting offers in China, strengthening its position in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and biotechnology.

Many researchers return home to continue building their careers without fear or restrictions. They bring their skills and experience from the best laboratories in the United States, which contributes to the development of China's academic environment and will undoubtedly help bring American "tricks" to Chinese laboratories and academies. Government recruitment programs provide funding, housing, and institutional support. This approach allows China to become a scientific superpower while the United States risks losing its edge. What was once America's greatest strength - welcoming talent from around the world - has become China's asset.

It is not just US academic institutions suffering from the talent drain. Silicon Valley, once a source of innovation, is now heavily dependent on political leadership and suffers from a lack of control over resources, talent, and influence. With the support of President Trump and initiatives such as the $500 billion Stargate project, tech companies are receiving unprecedented government support to expand their empires. Their dominance is based on a monopoly on data, energy, and the best AI researchers, many of whom are lured away from academia with million-dollar salaries. This concentration of power not only shapes the technology but also influences the direction of research, limiting critical oversight and steering the field toward corporate interests. While these companies claim to be developing artificial general intelligence for humanity's benefit, they perpetuate systems that deepen inequality, suppress democratic input, and reshape social life to suit their agendas.

Domestic Surveillance & Control

The quiet expansion of Palantir's role under the Trump administration reflects a dangerous shift in how power, technology, and surveillance are combined in the United States. While the public's attention is focused on headlines and election drama, the government is rapidly building the infrastructure for the potential creation of a master database that will contain sensitive American data. The pieces are falling into place with President Trump's executive order to unify federal data and the growing use of Palantir's Foundry system in agencies such as the Department of the Interior and the Department of Health and Human Services. By extracting such information, the authorities can track citizens' financial records, immigration history, medical status, and more, all under the pretext of security or "efficiency." 

From now on, Palantir risks losing its reputation as an independent, innovative, and risk-taking company with significant political implications. Additionally, Palantir employees are becoming aware of the responsibilities they will have in the future. 

While China is accelerating toward global leadership through a well-coordinated national innovation strategy, the United States seems to be digging its own grave through constant political infighting and excessive surveillance of citizens, gradually turning it into the hero of an Orwellian novel. 

At the same time, China is building an ecosystem in which breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and clean energy mutually reinforce one another, backed by government support and substantial investments. Despite being under sanctions, projects such as DeepSeek and Huawei's chip development show how Beijing is turning external pressure into fuel for self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, the United States clings to outdated advantages, alienating the scientists who once ensured its dominance. Immigration restrictions, funding cuts, and suspicion of researchers of Chinese descent are draining American universities of talent, many of whom are now finding better conditions, resources, and freedom to innovate in China. 

Instead of investing in democratic, transparent scientific progress, the United States invests billions in corporate giants that consolidate talent, energy, and data while avoiding public accountability. While China exports digital infrastructure through the Digital Silk Road, the US exports uncertainty and division. While China uses interdependence and state coordination to build momentum, the United States is moving toward fragmentation and disunity. Without a course correction, Washington risks losing the Fourth Industrial Revolution because it lacks the capacity and prefers control to cooperation, fear to foresight.

What's Next? Strategic Futures for the US and China

What could the US already do to extricate itself from its current situation? Chivvis believes there are only three real options: compete more effectively with China, adapt to its rise as part of a new balance of power, or prepare for open conflict. But time is not on Washington's side. While the United States remains preoccupied with domestic political fragmentation and transactional leadership under Trump, Beijing is promoting a long-term vision that is multidimensional, state-driven, and increasingly post-Western in orientation.

The most likely version of China in 2030 is not a bellicose aggressor but what RAND researchers call a "moderate authoritarian" government—a one-party system, but more transparent, pragmatic, and potentially more cooperative in the post-Xi era. In this scenario, Beijing is doubling down on its soft power strategy, as green energy exports, AI-enabled governance tools, and a digital Silk Road all contribute to shaping a new political proposition—authoritarian welfarism—that promises prosperity without democracy. Unlike autocracies of the past, this model appeals to countries in the Global South that seek order, infrastructure, and investment without the constraints of Western-style liberalism.

However, more destabilising scenarios remain on the agenda. A confrontational nationalist China, provoked by a crisis over Taiwan or the South China Sea, could lead to a significant war, triggering global sanctions and economic isolation similar to what Russia experienced. The result would be stagnation, isolation for China, and significant disruption to the worldwide economy. There is also the technology bloc scenario: a bifurcated digital order where China leads an alternative technological and governance ecosystem spanningg Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa and Latin America. In this world, we see more than just a trade war – we see a complete disintermediation of supply chains, standards, platforms, and alliances.

Campbell and Doshi warn that the real risk is China's rise and America's failure to see it. By assuming that this competition is primarily military or ideological, American leaders are overlooking the detailed, institutional, and infrastructural ways in which Beijing is reshaping the world order through its investments in ports, fibre optic cables, monopolies on rare earth resources, and the development of artificial intelligence governance norms. To counter this, they need more than slogans or tariffs. They need a coalition grand strategy: integrating partners in joint research, investing together in clean energy supply chains, and creating a counter-narrative based on inclusive, rule-based modernisation.  

Conclusion: The Shape of Global Power in 2030

We are not heading toward a simple handoff from a declining US to a rising China. Instead, we are witnessing a multipolar order still taking shape—one that may lean toward Beijing by default if the US continues to retreat from its leadership role. Trump's second term exemplifies this danger. His approach trades long-term strategic positioning for short-term, transactional collusion—often with authoritarian actors like Russia or Saudi Arabia. Rather than containing China, it empowers it by weakening American credibility, alienating allies, and hollowing out democratic institutions at home. As the article warns, "When great powers attempt to suppress challenges to a prevailing order, they often provoke a backlash." In Trump's case, the backlash isn't even provoked—it's self-inflicted.

At the same time, Silicon Valley's deep alignment with federal power, as illustrated by initiatives like the $500 billion Stargate Project and the data consolidation efforts with Palantir, shows that US technological dominance now rests on corporate monopolies rather than public innovation. China, by contrast, is leveraging its state capacity to scale up its digital and green infrastructure while actively absorbing top-tier scientists displaced by US immigration policies. As the US narrows its circle, China expands its networks.

The window for recalibration is closing. If Washington wants to remain a global leader—not just in defence but in defining the values and standards of the 21st century—it must pivot. This means reinvesting in R&D, reestablishing moral authority, and rebuilding trust-based alliances. Most of all, it must develop a vision that is not reactionary but generative—a vision that speaks to shared prosperity, not zero-sum fear.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution will not be won by inertia or bravado. It will be shaped by those who lead with foresight, legitimacy, and strategic coherence. The US fails to step up, it won't just lose influence—it will find the future already rewritten by others.