What Russia's Abandoning of INF Restraints Means for European & Transatlantic Security

Russia abandoned the final restrictions it was under under the now obsolete INF Treaty in August 2025. This decision shortened warning times and broadened the range of hybrid threats aimed at Europe, including ground-launched missiles, long-range drones, cyber operations and sabotage against the networks and nodes that keep the continent running. The greatest risk lies with critical infrastructure, where even limited disruption can have a knock-on effect across borders. The strategic conclusion is clear: do not rely on new arms control agreements with Moscow to restore stability. European security planners should treat this as a permanent change rather than a temporary spike in tension — one that will simultaneously test crisis management, resilience, and allied cohesion.

What Changed vs. The Original INF Treaty

The original INF Treaty set out clear boundaries: no ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres, regardless of whether they carried nuclear or conventional warheads. This was important, as it enabled the verified elimination of 2,692 missiles and anchored an intrusive inspection regime that helped stabilise Europe for a generation. However, the treaty's legal demise began with Washington's withdrawal in 2019. In the aftermath, Moscow signalled continued restraint by imposing a unilateral moratorium, which Russia will not abide by anymore.

Why did the moratorium matter? Because, even without formal constraints, it established practical guardrails, limiting deployments, shaping expectations and keeping escalation ladders shorter and more visible. With its end, those guardrails have gone, and ambiguity has returned as a deliberate instrument of pressure. Moscow has presented the move as consistent with its own rationale and timing, emphasising that it is a choice taken on its own schedule rather than a forced response to circumstances. In policy terms, this means that Europe can no longer rely on tacit restraint instead of treaty rules, nor can it assume that verification or predictability can be quickly rebuilt. The gap between peacetime signalling and crisis brinkmanship has narrowed, shifting the burden back to deterrence, resilience and rapid decision-making in allied capitals.

A Strategic Shift: Why Moscow Abandoned Restraint

Moscow's decision to officially abandon its self-imposed restrictions on the INF Treaty is not a sudden move, but rather the culmination of a long-term strategic shift. The main driver is Russia's overall goal of dividing transatlantic unity and weakening NATO from within. By creating new, direct military threats to Europe, the Kremlin seeks to present European capitals with a security dilemma: either increase their dependence on a potentially unstable United States or seek a compromise with Moscow on its terms.

In particular, this move is designed to exploit perceived political changes, notably the potential of a US administration that espouses an ‘America First’ policy and openly questions its NATO commitments, thereby undermining confidence in collective defence guarantees. Domestically, the creation of an external threat serves the classic purpose of mobilising public support for the regime and justifying huge military spending.

The logic behind this escalation is deeply rooted in Russian military doctrine, which exploits the ambiguity of dual-use systems (missiles such as the Iskander-M or the new 9M729 (SSC-8), which can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. By deploying these systems without treaty restrictions, Russia deliberately lowers the threshold for nuclear signals. The threat lies not necessarily in launching a nuclear strike, but in creating a constant, low-level nuclear alert. It is a coercive tool designed to intimidate European countries, paralyse their decision-making process during a crisis and, ultimately, separate their security policy from that of the United States. This ambiguity forces NATO planners to assume the worst-case scenario for each deployed missile, forcing them to treat each one as potentially equipped with nuclear weapons, which greatly complicates defence strategies.

Ultimately, this move signals the definitive end of the era of arms control after the Cold War. Russia's years of covert violations of the INF Treaty, followed by its official withdrawal, demonstrate that it views such agreements not as the basis for mutual security, but as temporary constraints that can be abandoned when they become strategically inconvenient. Combined with the integration of modern technologies such as hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced electronic warfare capabilities, Russia's actions confirm that any future negotiations on traditional arms control treaties are unacceptable. For European and transatlantic security planners, the key conclusion is that trust has been irrevocably broken; security can no longer be based on Russian promises or signatures on parchment, but only on reliable, effective deterrents and a demonstrated willingness to counter hybrid threats.

Implications for European Security

Coercion and intimidation. Expect continued probing at the kinetic edge, including drone activity on EU/NATO soil, which is designed to test thresholds, put air defences under stress, and cause political friction. Air hubs are especially vulnerable because they are the visible engines of allied logistics. Rzeszów-Jasionka in Poland and Ramstein in Germany are core nodes. As the US posture evolves, these platforms will become more symbolic and thus more attractive targets for pressure and attempted disruption. The objective is not necessarily to destroy capacity outright, but rather to cast doubt on the continuity of operations in places that are crucial for transatlantic support.

Disruption and paralysis. European energy and digital lifelines are under threat. Consider cyberattacks on power systems and data networks, as well as operations against ports, air bases and logistics hubs. Then there are blended physical–cyber actions targeting the connective tissue that Europeans seldom see yet always depend on. Undersea infrastructure is particularly vulnerable: cables and power connectors in the Baltic Sea concentrate risk in ways that adversaries understand well. While the EU’s Action Plan on Cable Security is part of the response, its very existence highlights the scale of exposure and the need for sustained attention. None of this occurs in isolation. Maritime lines of communication are important because they link European security to events on the continent's borders. Europe’s top container ports form the circulatory system of its economy, while Constanța on the Black Sea, coupled with the Danube canal, anchors strategically and symbolically important flows linked to Ukraine. This makes them obvious targets for harassment, disruption or deniable interference, which is intended to slow throughput and increase insurance, compliance and political costs, without provoking a conventional military response.

Subversion and panic. Within EU borders, the picture includes covert action, espionage, and sabotage—activities designed to spark outsized political impact from relatively low-cost operations. The pattern of 2024–25 arrests and investigations in Poland, Lithuania, the UK, and other member states points to networks tied to Russian services or proxies. Their playbook ranges from arson and parcel devices to vandalism aimed at logistics and symbolic sites. The immediate tactical effect can be modest; the strategic effect comes from repetition, geographic spread, and the perception that the state cannot protect what matters. These actions are paired with weaponised disinformation campaigns calibrated to amplify fear, sow confusion, and fracture cohesion—especially during moments of crisis when citizens are already primed to doubt official narratives.

Possible Future Scenarios (2026-2028)

The strategic landscape for European security in the coming years will be defined by two critical uncertainties: the degree of U.S. strategic engagement in Europe and the level of European political and military cohesion. The interplay of these factors creates four plausible, divergent scenarios.

●   S1: Engaged U.S. / Unified Europe: A revitalised transatlantic alliance confronts Russian aggression from a position of unified strength. In this "best-case" scenario, the U.S. reaffirms its ironclad commitment to NATO, while EU members accelerate defence integration and spending. Joint investments in a multi-layered Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) architecture and deep-strike capabilities render Russian missile threats less potent. This unified front successfully deters further Russian aggression, though the political conditions for this outcome make it more of an aspirational benchmark than a probable forecast in the current climate.

●   S2: Engaged U.S. / Fractured Europe: The U.S. remains militarily present, but its political approach is divisive, perhaps favouring bilateral deals with certain allies while undermining broader EU unity. This allows Russia to exploit internal European seams with targeted disinformation, cyberattacks, and political coercion against more vulnerable member states. While NATO’s core military structure holds, Russia is able to achieve strategic gains below the threshold of open conflict, weakening the EU and creating a tense, unstable standoff where the alliance is constantly reacting to Moscow-initiated crises.

●   S3: Constrained U.S. / Unified Europe: Faced with a United States that has pivoted away from Europe or become an unreliable partner, European powers are shocked into action. Led by a Franco-German-Polish core, the EU aggressively pursues strategic autonomy. This involves pooling military resources, launching a massive defence-industrial program to fill critical capability gaps, and establishing an independent European defence posture. This path is a decade-long project at minimum, making the 2026-2028 period one of high risk and vulnerability as the difficult transition begins.

●   S4: Constrained U.S. / Fractured Europe (Worst-Case Scenario): The absence of credible U.S. leadership combined with deepening European disunity creates a security vacuum. Russia capitalises on this weakness, using its military and energy leverage to intimidate individual nations. Some countries, feeling abandoned, are tempted to cut separate bilateral deals with Moscow, such as non-aggression assurances in exchange for political neutrality or long-term energy contracts that create new dependencies. This effectively neutralises them as part of a collective European response and leads to the functional collapse of the post-Cold War security order.

Proactive Agenda for EU and NATO

To counter Russia's escalating threats, a reactive posture is insufficient. EU and NATO members must pursue a proactive, multi-domain agenda focused on deterrence, resilience, and collective will.

1. Build a Deterrent Wall: The immediate priority is to accelerate the deployment of a robust, multi-layered Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) architecture, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative, incorporating space-based assets for surveillance and early warning. Simultaneously, critical infrastructure (ports, energy hubs, undersea cables, and digital networks) must be hardened against both kinetic and cyber-attacks to convince Moscow that a coercive strike would fail.

2. Develop Credible Conventional Strike: Deterrence requires not just defence but also the ability to impose costs. European allies, acting in coalition, must develop and field a credible conventional deep-strike capability. The goal is not to adopt a first-strike posture, but to create strategic ambiguity, forcing Russian planners to consider the vulnerability of their own high-value assets on their own territory and thereby deterring aggression from the outset.

3. Foster "Mini-lateral" Security Compacts: In a political environment where consensus among all NATO members can be slow, smaller, agile security pacts are crucial. Geographically and politically aligned state clusters such as the Nordic nations through Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Bucharest Nine (B9) on the eastern flank, or a Poland-Romania-Ukraine grouping can deepen operational planning and intelligence sharing to ensure a baseline of rapid collective defense.

4. Pool Industrial Resources for "Arsenal of Democracy": Europe can no longer afford fragmented national defence markets. The EU must urgently pool resources for joint munitions production, streamline procurement through mechanisms like the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), and secure critical supply chains. This requires long-term procurement contracts from governments to give industry the confidence to invest in expanding production lines.

5. Seize the Narrative: Proactively expose and counter Russian disinformation that frames its deployments as a defensive response to NATO aggression. This can be achieved by creating a dedicated transatlantic fusion cell for countering hybrid threats, combining intelligence analysts with strategic communications experts to pre-bunk false narratives and leverage declassified intelligence to expose Russian intentions.

6. Shift from Treaties to Practical Risk Reduction: While new arms control treaties with Russia are off the table, the focus must shift to rebuilding the rulebook for strategic competition. This involves practical, multilateral transparency and risk-reduction measures, including strengthening military-to-military crisis communication channels and establishing clear protocols for de-conflicting incidents. It's not about trust; it's about building guardrails to manage a dangerous competition and prevent accidents from escalating into war.