Can Europe Become Militarily Independent from the US?

European leaders are voicing a growing resolve for military autonomy amid shifting geopolitical winds. “Don’t ask America what it can do for our security. Ask what we can do for our own security,” urged Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in January. That call feels ever more urgent after Poland shot down several drones that violated its airspace on September 10 – the first time a NATO member has directly engaged Russian drones since the Ukraine war began. Such incidents underscore that Europe faces immediate threats on its doorstep and cannot always assume prompt American intervention. As one EU official put it, Europe has “a hot war on European soil” and an “existential” security threat. Can Europe, long reliant on the U.S. military, realistically stand on its own? Achieving true independence will require Europe to invest in emerging technologies, reduce its dependence on U.S. hardware, protect its vulnerable infrastructure from sabotage, and ruthlessly prioritise collective defence projects over fragmented national programs. The following analysis examines these challenges and opportunities in detail.

Emerging Disruptive Technologies

Hypersonic Missiles: The European Union has identified hypersonic weapons as one of its “critical and foundational” defence technologies. These are missiles that travel faster than Mach 5 (over 6,100 km/h) and can manoeuvre in-flight, making them extremely hard to track and intercept. Russia and China have already deployed such weapons, and a recent Anglo-American trial carried out 233 hypersonic engine tests in just six weeks. Europe is trying not to be left behind. In 2024, France, Germany, Italy and Poland launched the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) project to jointly develop new long-range missiles (1,000–2,000 km range) and bolster Europe’s industrial capacity. 

Six nations – including Britain and Sweden – are now participating in ELSA, reflecting a recognition that no single country can afford to build these cutting-edge systems alone. Simply put, Europe must accelerate development of its own advanced missiles, or risk permanent inferiority in this critical domain.

Stealth Platforms and Counter-Stealth: American stealth assets like the B‑2 Spirit bomber and F‑35 fighter illustrate the game-changing value of low-observable platforms that can strike with impunity. Europe has capable generation jets (Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale), but as one expert noted, “there are European alternatives, none of them compete with the F‑35” in stealth and sensor fusion. At least 38 F-35s were delivered from the U.S. to European air forces in 2024 alone. If Europe is to lessen its reliance on U.S. airpower, it must invest in stealth technology – whether through an indigenous 5-generation fighter project, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), or advanced radar and space-based sensors to detect stealthy threats. The EU’s latest plans heavily emphasise integrated air and missile defence, including shared early-warning satellites and over-the-horizon radars among 18 member states. In practice, this means Europe is starting to pool resources for things like next-gen counter-stealth radar networks and interceptor systems that can handle everything from drones up to hypersonic glide vehicles. These investments are crucial so that Europe can both field highly survivable strike platforms and defeat those deployed by adversaries.

Swarming Drones and AI Warfare: The war in Ukraine has vividly demonstrated that swarms of cheap drones can destroy even expensive armour and aircraft. In fact, about 66% of Russian tanks, vehicles and other hardware destroyed in 2022 were taken out by drones rather than traditional manned units. Future conflicts will only see more AI-guided systems and autonomous “loitering munitions” (kamikaze drones) saturating the battlespace. Nearly 20 EU states just signed a letter of intent pledging cooperation on anti-drone systems, electronic warfare (EW), and other air defence assets. This means developing jammers, directed-energy weapons, and AI-driven command systems capable of detecting and defeating drone swarms in real time. 

The European Defence Agency stresses that space-based sensors, secure communications, and artificial intelligence will be integral to this effort. Some programs are already underway – for example, the EU’s latest defence fund round is financing projects for swarm drone countermeasures and AI-enabled image analysis for threat detection. But much more needs to be done. Investing in these emerging technologies now will give Europe a chance to leapfrog traditional force shortcomings. A drone costing €35,000 can disable a €5 million tank, so mastering such asymmetries is a smart way for Europe to get more defence value for its euro. In short, Europe must innovate or risk falling behind – and recent commitments indicate that leaders finally grasp this.

Europe’s Dependency on US Military Capability

European militaries remain heavily dependent on American-made weapons despite recent pushes for high-tech self-reliance. Close to half of all fighter jets in active European air forces are of U.S. origin, and American missile defence systems (like Patriot batteries) are the most widely deployed on the continent. U.S.-sourced hardware also fills European inventories of tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, and helicopters – raising doubts about whether Europe could sustain a major conflict without U.S. resupply. Recent data is illuminating: since 2020, EU countries (plus the UK and Norway) have imported over 26,000 missiles from abroad, yet less than 10% of those came from fellow European states. In fact, Europe buys far more munitions from the United States (and even suppliers like Israel or South Korea) than from its own neighbours.

The F‑35 Lightning II program perfectly exemplifies this imbalance. The F-35 – a U.S.-built stealth multirole jet – has become the dominant choice for next-generation European fighter fleets. Numerous countries, from Poland and Norway to Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Britain, are either flying or ordering F-35s. While Europe does field advanced fighters like the Eurofighter Typhoon and France’s Rafale (and has a new Franco-German “FCAS” jet in development), none of these compete with the F‑35’s capabilities. The American jet’s massive development budget (well over $1 trillion over its lifecycle) produced cutting-edge stealth and sensor technology that no single European state could afford to match. This highlights a structural problem: next-gen systems need huge upfront investment and economies of scale that Europe’s fragmented national programs struggle to muster. It’s a significant reason so many European governments have opted to import the F‑35 or other U.S. systems off-the-shelf instead of trying to build equivalents at home.

One striking example is Poland’s recent buying spree. Warsaw has aggressively rearmed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – but it turned essentially to non-European suppliers for key equipment. Poland inked a deal for M1A1 Abrams tanks from the U.S. (with first deliveries in 2024) and also bought K2 Black Panther tanks from South Korea. Thanks to these acquisitions, Poland will soon field more tanks than France, Britain, and Germany combined. Many of these purchases filled gaps that European suppliers couldn’t plug quickly (or at all), since outside of a few major powers, many EU countries lack a strong domestic defence industry. In short, when urgent needs arose, Poland (like others) looked abroad – often to the U.S. – for advanced hardware that European manufacturers were unable to deliver in time.

Beyond just weapons platforms, Europe also leans on the U.S. “strategic enablers” – the satellites, secure communications networks, surveillance drones, and logistical infrastructure that knit modern warfare together. When European nations buy American weapons, they often plug into American-controlled systems for targeting, intelligence-sharing, and maintenance. This brings advantages (instant interoperability with U.S. forces) but also deepens dependency. If Washington’s foreign policy shifts or U.S. stockpiles run low, Europe could be left in the lurch. This was starkly illustrated when President Trump suspended military aid to Ukraine and even suggested downgrading fighters sold to Europe – moves that exposed how heavily Europe relies on Washington. A European defence expert described some allies’ view of the U.S. as a “gigantic Walmart” of weapons always in stock – whereas the reality is “you end up in a queue” for complex arms. In other words, buying from the U.S. means competing with other American clients worldwide, and the U.S. military itself always gets priority for new deliveries. Indeed, in early 2025, the Pentagon reviewed its munitions stockpiles and temporarily halted certain arms exports, catching European partners off guard and forcing them to wait for. Such episodes underscore the risk: Europe’s predominantly American-built defences could become a point of leverage – or be scaled back – if U.S. priorities change.

These dependency dilemmas have been a wake-up call. As one expert put it, right now, “sovereignty doesn’t sit in Europe – it’s in Washington” when it comes to defence. Even the United States has learned a hard lesson about over-reliance on foreign sources. For example, about 20% of the U.S. electric grid is powered by nuclear plants running on Russian fuel, and America’s nuclear industry became “almost wholly dependent” on Russian-enriched uranium in recent decades. Only after Russia invaded Ukraine did Washington move to ban Russian uranium imports – and even then, the ban won’t fully take effect until 2028. Suppose a superpower like the U.S. can find itself so reliant on a geopolitical rival for something as critical as energy. In that case, Europe can certainly appreciate the strategic risk of dependency in the defence realm.

During the Cold War, Western Europe’s security famously depended on U.S. protection; today, the U.S. remains NATO’s linchpin. Europe’s goal now is not to sever the transatlantic alliance, but to ensure itself against the possibility that the U.S. might be unwilling or unable to come to Europe’s aid in a future crisis. That insurance means developing redundant capabilities and supply chains so Europe isn’t forced into policy compromises by a sudden cutoff of U.S. support (or by Washington’s attention being diverted elsewhere). There are promising signs: in 2025, Brussels approved a €150 billion “Security Action for Europe” (SAFE) loans package to spur joint defence purchases within Europe rather than from the U.S. The SAFE framework even offers discounted loans for collaborative European projects, aiming to reduce the fragmentation of Europe’s defence industry and break the “buy American” habit of EU members. Still, reversing decades of dependency will be a long slog – one that must overcome industrial limitations and political inertia. The effort is underway, but building genuine European self-reliance in defence will require sustained commitment in the years ahead.

Russian Sabotage and Infrastructure Threats

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Europe has suffered over 100 clandestine sabotage incidents targeting critical infrastructure. These have hit railways, pipelines, power grids and military depots via arson, bombings, cyberattacks and even undersea cable cuts. For example, in late 2024, a Chinese cargo ship appeared to drag its anchor and sever two data cables between Sweden and Estonia. At least three major undersea telecom cables or pipelines have been cut in the Baltic since 2022, underscoring how Europe’s lifelines can be severed with ease.

Western agencies report that Moscow now uses “disposable” proxies – often paid criminals or extremists recruited via encrypted apps – to carry out sabotage across Europe. These operators have no obvious link to Russia, making attribution very difficult. Recent cases illustrate this trend: German authorities say a mixed German-Russian cell planned bomb and arson attacks on a U.S. Army base and other targets – a “textbook illustration” of this new warfare. In Britain, a Wagner-linked group attempted to burn a London warehouse of Ukrainian-bound military supplies, but the plotters were caught and convicted. Similar arrests have been reported in Poland and the Baltic states, where suspected Russian/Belarusian operatives were caught filming rail lines and power sites. Such plots spread confusion and force governments to defend a vast array of civilian targets.

NATO has acknowledged these threats and bolstered defences. Naval minehunters now carry hull-mounted sonar and deploy underwater drones and divers to inspect cables and pipelines for tampering. A NATO centre in London has been opened to map vulnerable undersea infrastructure. Still, commanders admit they cannot patrol every link – as one noted, a single merchant anchor can cut cables undetected. The emphasis is thus on resilience: telecom firms are laying redundant fibre-optic cables and satellite backup links so that if one route is cut, data automatically reroutes. In effect, networks and grids are being designed with no single point of failure.

Strategic Priorities: What to Fund — and What to Drop

Europe’s recent defence spending surge raises the question of where to allocate resources most effectively. Experts highlight several critical areas and urge dropping redundant programs.

• Layered Air & Missile Defence: Integrated air and missile defence must top Europe’s list. In November 2024, 18 EU members agreed to pool efforts for a standard air-defence system (Patriot, SAMP/T, modern radars and interceptors). Ukraine’s experience has underscored the need for short-range defences too: Europe is urgently fielding more anti-aircraft guns, jammers, mobile guns and directed-energy weapons to counter drones and missiles. The EU has made electronic warfare and counter-drone systems a priority: 14 countries are funding joint EW projects.

• Munitions Stockpiles: High-intensity combat burns ammunition far faster than peacetime. To avoid shortages, EU nations are co-producing and co-procuring artillery rounds, rockets, anti-tank and air-to-air missiles. For example, in early 2023, several countries jointly agreed to buy 155mm artillery shells in a single large order, spurring factories to boost production. Similar pooled procurement schemes are being developed for precision rockets and anti-air missiles. In effect, Europe is jointly underwriting its munitions industry to ensure sustained warfighting capacity.

• Supply Chain Resilience: Dependence on single foreign suppliers has proven dangerous. The 2022 energy crisis taught Europe that “dependency equals vulnerability.” Accordingly, the EU is diversifying its fuel and power sources (building LNG terminals, interconnectors, renewables, and new nuclear) and pushing technology sovereignty (for example, the Chips Act to boost domestic semiconductors). Critical inputs like chips, batteries and AI processors are being brought into European supply chains through public-private R&D and investments. The aim is to “bootstrap” key industries so that no adversary can choke off essential components.

• Research, Development & Innovation: Europe must vastly ramp up defence R&D. In 2023, EU countries averaged only ~4% of defence budgets on R&D, versus roughly 15% in the U.S. Many analysts argue Europe should aim for double-digit R&D shares (15–20%) to close the gap. The European Defence Fund (EDF) is already pushing forward: its 2024 budget round allocated about €910 million to 62 collaborative projects in drones, autonomous systems, and hypersonic-missile defence. Joint programs like these both drive innovation and spread costs, helping Europe develop cutting-edge capabilities (AI, quantum, space comms, etc.) on a competitive footing.

• Procurement Rationalisation: With finite budgets, Europe must stop funding redundant systems. Instead of each country fielding a unique design, governments should converge on a few common platforms. The EU’s new “SAFE” loans scheme explicitly rewards joint purchases of identical equipment. Experts note that decades-old fears of sharing technology have faded: many now argue that Europe’s massive dependence on U.S. arms means “sovereignty doesn’t sit in Europe – it’s in Washington”. NATO now explicitly encourages spending on modern tech (drones, AI, cyber) instead of building a static “Maginot Line” of legacy hardware. In practice, this means standardising on a couple of tank and aircraft models rather than dozens, and favouring interoperable systems that can be produced at scale.

Conclusion

European leaders stress this effort is about readiness, not isolation. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned, “Don’t ask America what it can do for our security. Ask yourselves what we can do for our own security”. Russia’s aggression and recent U.S. policy shocks have jolted Europe into action for the first time in a generation. The current momentum — higher budgets, joint funds, collaborative projects and streamlined procurement — is unprecedented. EU Foreign Affairs Chief Kaja Kallas has warned Europe faces a “hot war on our soil” and must prepare for the worst, saying “the threat is existential…it’s as real as it can get”.