Is Europe Preparing for a High-Intensity Conflict? A Scenario-Based Assessment.

Executive Summary:

Short conclusion: Europe is not on an inevitable path to a full-scale interstate war, but its political-military posture has shifted toward preparing for higher-intensity conflict; several plausible scenarios – from hybrid coercion to conventional escalation – should be monitored.

Main drivers: (1) Russia's continued military build-up and doctrinal changes; (2) NATO and EU rearmament and industrial surge (Readiness 2030 / ReArm Europe); (3) growth of hybrid, cyber, and nuclear-coercion risks.

Key indicators to watch: scale/location of future Zapad exercises; pace and bindingness of NATO/EU defence spending and procurement; changes in Russian nuclear wording or deployments; increased cross-border incidents and cyber-sabotage.

What to watch - indicators and their meaning

• Large exercise timing & anomalous troop movements (Zapad & other exercises): Exercises can hide operational deployments or test force readiness. Watch for troop concentrations outside declared zones, unusual rail/road movements of armour/logistics, and exercises followed by rapid, unexpected demobilisation.• Mobilisation/logistics pre-positioning (ammo, fuel, rail/port use): Sustained logistic surges indicate preparation for longer, higher-intensity combat. Watch for large convoys, railcars with armour, and port/airfield buildup reported in OSINT or official logistics notices.• NATO/EU spending and procurement pipelines: Rapid, legally binding procurement commitments and activation of EU/NATO financing instruments indicate durable shifts toward deterrence and war-preparedness.• Nuclear posture and declaratory changes: Any lowering of doctrinal thresholds or redeployments to allied territory (e.g., Belarus) raises escalation risk. Watch for official doctrine changes and credible reporting of tactical nuclear deployments.• Cross-border deniable operations (“little green men”): Covert incursions and ambiguous forces are used to create faits accomplis. Watch for ambiguous military presence and sudden local unrest with military backing.• Major cyberattacks on critical infrastructure: Cyber campaigns targeting energy, ports, logistics or command-and-control can coerce and disrupt. Monitor large outages and public attribution by credible cybersecurity firms or national CERTs.• Public political signals/alliance cohesion (US statements, parliamentary votes): Public wavering by major allies, delays in spending votes, or domestic political crises in key capitals can affect deterrence credibility.• Industrial capacity & supply-chain stress (munitions, engines): Shortages in munitions or parts, delayed deliveries, and retooling announcements are signs of attrition vulnerabilities.• Information environment/influence operations: Coordinated disinformation surges often precede or accompany kinetic moves. Watch for sudden narrative spikes and false-flag claims across multiple channels.

Methodology

The article adopts a qualitative analytical methodology that combines historical review, policy analysis, and interpretation of statistical data from reputable sources such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the European Defence Agency (EDA), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). It integrates secondary data, including defence spending figures, geopolitical trend reports, and official statements by political and military leaders, in order to identify patterns, correlations, and potential future scenarios regarding European security. The approach involves examining past events (e.g., Russia’s actions in Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine), military expenditure trends, and analysing recurring military exercises like Zapad to infer potential timelines for conflict. This mixed historical-descriptive and trend-based projection allows the author to develop three plausible scenarios for Europe’s future security environment, with a particular focus on the likelihood of war with Russia.

Introduction

After more than 70 years of relative peace on the European continent, some people have begun to wonder, “Could another world war break out in the near future?” Some would argue that we are living in the safest time in human history. However, others would say that levels of insecurity are increasing day by day as humanity faces new obstacles.

Over the past couple of years, several narratives, events and details have drawn my attention to the possibility of an emerging conflict. Some of these will be presented below, by trying to be as brief as possible. However, the subject is a complex one, and as we all know, the future cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, the hypothesis explored in this article is that Europe’s political-military posture is shifting toward preparing for higher-intensity armed conflict with Russia - a development that creates multiple plausible scenarios.

The international context

Nowadays, in some parts of the world (like the African continent or the Levant region), it is a normality to live in a state that faces multiple security crises, while in other regions (like Europe), people are enjoying their lives without wondering if something will happen to them tomorrow.

At the moment, if we look over the worldwide situation, we can observe several things: - The African continent is plagued by conflicts over resources and spheres of influence

- The Middle East is boiling (the conflicts in Israel, Syria, Iran, etc., are intensifying day by day)

- Central American states face serious security problems related to drugs and not only

- South Asia and South-East Asia tensions are rising 

- The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 showed that Europe is not immune to armed conflicts, even though it has enjoyed a very long period of peace compared to the continent's history

- It could be argued that many analysts describe a new era of sustained strategic competition, with important differences from the Cold War, even though this fact is not widely acknowledged. Although a few characteristics of a Cold War are missing (such as an ideological conflict or proxy wars), the conflict between the United States and China has become increasingly tense in recent years

In addition to the already tense international context, in the analysis conducted by Graham Allison, known as the Thucydides Trap, it was concluded that 12 out of 16 (75%) similar cases to the one between the United States and China ended in a war (Allison, 2015). Statistically, the situation doesn’t look good at all. As Graham Allison mentions, the competition between the US and China could end in war: “War between the U.S. and China is more likely than recognised at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not.” (Allison, 2015).

Another important detail for the international context is the global arms race. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the military expenditure of all the states reached $2718 billion in 2024, increasing by 9,4% over the previous year, the steepest year-on-year increase since at least the end of the Cold War (SIPRI, 2025). 

Global defence spending surged in 2024 amid rising geopolitical tensions. 

In Europe, countries like Poland and Sweden sharply increased their military budgets, while Germany’s 28% rise to $88.5 billion made it the world’s fourth-largest spender (Kheiriddin, 2025). Germany’s approach to defence reflects a deliberate shift from its historical reticence toward rearmament toward a central role in NATO’s modern deterrence architecture. As Bundeswehr reforms accelerate under Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, Germany has unified its command structures and elevated cyber capabilities to the same standing as its traditional military branches, underscoring its ambition to stand as NATO’s backbone in Europe (Alipour, 2024). Exercises such as Quadriga 2024, part of NATO’s larger Steadfast Defender 2024, saw over 12,000 Bundeswehr personnel rehearse the rapid movement of forces and logistics across German territory toward NATO’s eastern flank. Meanwhile, the classified “Operations Plan Germany” (OPLAN DEU) codifies how military and civilian actors across federal, state, and economic sectors will coordinate to facilitate the transit of allied troops, secure critical infrastructure, and preserve operational readiness in crisis, all while remaining within Germany’s constitutional framework (Bodemann, 2024). Rather than echo past eras, this posture emphasises Germany’s role as a resilient, integrated hub of deterrence anchored in NATO solidarity. 

In the Middle East, Israel posted a staggering 65% increase, its biggest since 1967, amid conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. Across Asia, China’s $314 billion defence budget stoked concerns over Taiwan, which also raised spending, as did Japan with its largest increase since 1952 (Kheiriddin, 2025). On the supply side, traditional arms exporters such as the U.S., France, Russia, China, and Germany still lead, but newer players like India, Turkey, and especially Israel are gaining ground. Israel’s defence exports hit a record $14.8 billion, with European demand driving the surge (Kheiriddin, 2025).

The European regional context

The beginning of the 21^st century appears to be more than intriguing if we look at the European region and its near abroad. To understand the regional context, we have to look back at what happened in 2008. At first, the NATO summit was held in Bucharest on 2-4 April. During the summit, Vladimir Putin made his first appearance at the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) since the creation of the NRC in 2002 (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). During the event, Vladimir Putin declared that NATO expansion would force Russia to respond by taking measures to protect its security (President of Russia, 2008). Besides this declaration, let’s not forget that Vladimir Putin declared a few years ago that the dissolution of the USSR is the greatest tragedy of the 20^th century (TASS, 2021). At the same time, NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia would join the alliance, but they didn’t receive a Membership Action Plan (Gray, 2023). Five months after the NATO summit, the Russian Federation invaded Georgia, starting the first war in Europe in the 21^st century (Dickinson, 2021).

Source: Historia

A few years later, on March 16, 2014, a referendum was organised in Crimea. According to the Kremlin, 82% of the electorate took part in the vote and 96% of them spoke in favour of reuniting with Russia (President of Russia, 2014). After the referendum, Vladimir Putin confirmed the annexation of the peninsula (Walker, 2014).  Despite the result of the referendum and the annexation, the Council of the European Union did not recognise Russia’s action and declared that it was illegal (Council of the European Union, 2014). A month later, Vladimir Putin declared that Russia was forced to annexe Crimea as a response to NATO enlargement into eastern Europe (Reuters, 2014). 

The latest blow to security and peace in Europe was dealt on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attacking it from multiple directions. Until the moment this article was written, the hostilities didn’t cease. Moreover, in a world where political realism plays an increasingly important role, it is worth mentioning the idea of Zbigniew Brzezinski: "Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceased to be a Eurasian empire." (Brzezinski, 2016).

However, in addition to Russia's actions in Ukraine and Georgia, there are many other factors that could influence how European security will look in the coming years. One of the most important factors is the rise of extremist parties at the European level in recent years. The last century has shown us what the repercussions of the rise to power of such parties can be (the Nazi Party in Germany, the Fascist Party in Italy, etc.) and let us not forget that, in the case of Germany, the Nazi Party came to power through a legitimate democratic process, following the German federal elections of July 1932. 

Military spending - Europe versus Russia

Since the article's hypothesis revolves around the possibility of a military conflict in Europe, we must consider the military spending of both parties.

On the one hand, by looking at the data from the European Defence Agency (EDA) regarding the military spending of the member states, we can see an interesting trend. Between 2005 and 2008, the military expenditure of the states' part in EDA was stable, but after the invasion of Georgia, the military expenditure declined from 210 billion euros in 2008 to 182 billion euros in 2014. The key event that seems to bring European states to reality is the annexation of Crimea by Russia. As we can see from the EDA data, after the annexation of Crimea, there was a steady increase in military spending, and after the invasion of Ukraine in 202,2, military spending increased sharply. Thus, we can deduce how seriously European states see the threat coming from Russia. In addition, we must take into account that NATO countries expressed this year, at the Hague NATO summit, their commitment to spend 5% of their GDP on defence investments, of which 3,5% will be allocated to meet core defence requirements for the alliance, and the remaining 1,5% will be allocated on critical infrastructure, defending networks, civil preparedness and resilience, innovation and to strengthen the defence industrial base (North Atlantic Treaty Organziation, 2025).

Moreover, in March 2025, the European Commission revealed the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030. Through this plan, the European Union aims to allocate €800 billion towards defence spending by leveraging national fiscal flexibility, introducing a new €150 billion loan instrument (SAFE) for joint procurement, potentially redirecting cohesion funds, and expanding support from the European Investment Bank (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025). 

On the other hand, I decided to collect data on Russian military spending from two sources: The Military Balance volumes published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The reasoning behind this action is to compare the total amount of expenses, which should be taken with a dose of suspicion, because they do not represent real expenses but only some estimates of them (the same increased attention should be paid to EDA data, which, although more transparent, can be distorted). As can be seen from the graphs below, the military expenditure trend is similar in both the EDA and SIPRI data. The most significant difference between the two data sources is the total money allocated for the military sector. Thus, it can be seen that the values provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies for the military budget are lower than those in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database. Besides the military budget, the gross domestic product spent on the military by Russia was relatively constant between 2000 and 2020, being somewhere around 4%, but it had a small increase after the annexation of Crimea, reaching 5,4% in 2016. After 2022, the percentage of GDP allocated to the military increased, but let's not forget that Russia switched to a war economy after the invasion of Ukraine, which led to more investment in the military and even economic growth (Connolly, 2025).

Declarations and projections of European states regarding the war

In recent years, several high-ranking European officials have issued increasingly alarming statements concerning the possibility of war on the European continent. These declarations, often marked by a tone of urgency and concern, gained significant momentum following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, the public discourse in numerous European states has reflected a growing awareness of potential security threats, with some leaders warning of scenarios once considered unthinkable. This shift in rhetoric has been accompanied by projections about future military engagements, defence readiness, and the broader implications of continued conflict near or within Europe’s borders.

- The head of the British army has warned UK citizens to be prepared for a war on the scale of the great conflicts of the 20th Century (Naughtie, 2024)

- The Swedish defence minister and commander-in-chief declared that Sweden could be facing a war (Szumski, 2024)

- According to Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service, Russia is preparing for a military confrontation with the West within the next decade and could be deterred by a counter build-up of armed forces (Sytas, 2024).

- The German defence minister declared that the EU should be prepared for a war by the end of the decade (digital team, 2023). Moreover, in 2024, a secret plan of a Russian invasion scenario was leaked, revealing that Germany is preparing for a war in Europe in the near future (Carbonaro, 2024). In addition, Germany’s Foreign Intelligence Service declared that it has evidence of Russia’s plans to attack NATO by testing the credibility of NATO’s Article 5 (Diakonov, 2025). In another declaration, Germany’s defence chief said that Russia may attack NATO in 2029 (Gardner & Wong, 2025).

- This year, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte declared that Russia could be ready to attack NATO by 2030 (Sabbagh, 2025). Another declaration that he made is that Russia is producing more ammunition than NATO (Murray, 2025).

The Zapad military exercises

The Zapad military exercise (translated in English as “West”; similar to Russia’s Vostok or “East” military exercise) is conducted by Russia in cooperation with Belarus. This exercise represents one of the most significant demonstrations of military capability near NATO's eastern borders. These large-scale drills are organised roughly every four years in autumn and reflect Moscow's strategic priorities in the Western theatre, simulating high-intensity conflict scenarios. Zapad exercises serve as a powerful political signalling tool, both to domestic audiences and neighbouring states, highlighting Russia’s readiness to project force and deter perceived threats. In recent years, their growing complexity and scale have raised concerns among European governments, reinforcing fears about regional stability and the potential for rapid escalation. If we look closer at the Zapad exercises organised in recent years, we can observe an interesting pattern: Before or after the exercise, Russia carried out a military action, either by attacking another state or by testing the threshold.

Zapad 2009 - the exercise took place a year after the invasion of Georgia

Zapad 2013 - the exercise took place a year before the annexation of Crimea

Zapad 2017 - no invasion/annexation took place before and after the exercise, but during the exercise, the airspace of Lithuania (Xinhua, 2017)

Zapad 2021 - the exercise took place a year before the invasion of Ukraine

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the Russian military conducted an unusually high number of exercises in the months leading up to the active phase of Zapad-2021 (Clark & Barros, 2021).

Zapad 2025 - This year, the exercise will take place in September. Belarus announced that this year the exercise will be relocated away from the borders and the military personnel will be lower in order to reduce tensions (Preiherman, 2025)

Zapad 2029? - According to the fact that the exercise is usually organised every four years, the next Zapad should take place in 2029

Zapad 2033? - According to the fact that the exercise is usually organised every four years. The second Zapad exercise to be organised in the future could take place in 2033

Scenarios

1. There are real chances of a war on the European continent

In this scenario, an escalation of tensions can be observed both at the European level and between the US and China. All these growing tensions are reinforced by an international arms race, but also by the rise of extremist parties at the European level. Regarding the European continent, we have seen several declarations from high-ranking officials. These declarations can be interpreted through the lens of the securitisation process, but on the other hand, could be seen as statements that aim to prepare the population for a possible conflict

2. Deterrence of Russia

As Estonia has stated, Russia could be deterred by a buildup of forces. However, given Russia's history, this is not the most likely option.

3. Launching a Cold War-style arms race with the aim of bankrupting Russia

This arms race launched by European states against Russia may be a similar approach to that during the Cold War, when the US and Russia competed in an arms race that ultimately led to the fall of the USSR.

Of these three scenarios, I would opt for the first as more likely, but when could a war start?

Based on the public statements of European officials, we can already establish several reference years:

• 2029 (for Germany’s projection of a war)

• 2030 (for NATO’s projection for a war) 

• 2030-2039 / next decade (according to Estonia’s projection).

As mentioned before, in 2029, the next Zapad exercise should take place, and the next one after that should be organised in 2033. But considering the Zapad exercise patter,n we can narrow down the potential years when a potential conflict could occur. Starting from the premise that these exercises will be organised and will not be postponed, the following years can be identified:

2030 - Compared to Zapad 2013 and Zapad 2021, a significant event took place a year after the military exercise

2032 - Compared to Zapad 2009, a significant event could take place a year before the exercise

These years coincide with the declarations of the officials from Estonia and NATO. But if we look into more details, there are a few interesting things that we could observe:

The year 2030 coincides with:

- EU ReArm Europe Plan

The year 2032 coincides with:

- The next presidential elections in the United States

- The milestone set by China of finalising the modernisation of the military (the milestone is set to be achieved by 2035, but I assume China will reach the milestone earlier, or at least finish a part of the modernisation actions)

Thus, a potential aggression from the Russian part could take place amid Zapad 2029 exercise, more specifically by disguising troops as part of the exercise in order to deploy them near theatres of operations.

Also, a military conflict could start in 2032 amid presidential elections in the United States, but also amid the intensification of the conflict between the US and China. Therefore, American decision-making will be paralysed, which will allow Russia to carry out aggressive military actions against Europe. From my point of view, this scenario will depend on the US presidential elections in 2028, and depending on who is president during that period, the scenario can be validated or invalidated.