The Geopolitics of the Arctic: A New Theatre for Conflict and Competition

Introduction

An often-overlooked region of the world, the Arctic has risen in visibility and global significance, extending beyond the implications of climate change, most recently reaching a zenith of global interest thanks to the US's overtures to buy or occupy Greenland. However, the geostrategic importance of the Arctic extends beyond US interests and even the interests of Arctic states, presenting new economic opportunities and security threats simultaneously. Despite being a shrinking territory due to climate change and being home to a comparatively small population of 4 million people, the Arctic is likely to become a more significant theatre of great power competition in the coming years. This article primarily examines the military and economic dimensions of Arctic competition and assesses the extent to which these currently pose a risk to global peace. It will, as present and future, primarily examine challenges to the Region.

Before delving into the economic and military aspects of the Arctic, it is essential to have a comprehensive overview of the region as a whole. Spanning three continents and eight countries, the Arctic is approximately 14.5 million square kilometres in size, and with its glaciers and tundra, it is home to an estimated 21000 species. An estimated 4 million people live in the Arctic, comprising indigenous communities, non-indigenous citizens of Arctic states, and researchers. Currently, forecasts from Canadian researchers suggest that there are a total of 69 “continuously attended military sites” in the Arctic, with 32 of these sites being located in Russia. This is an addition to an estimated 475 military bases along Russia's vast northern border with the Arctic. The region is also home to a vast array of untapped natural resources, including an estimated 400 oil and gas fields, as well as valuable minerals and precious metals.

1. Global Governance Challenges

Global governance presents a challenge to ensuring the Arctic does not become an arena for armed superpower confrontation in the future. Whilst the Arctic Council oversees much of the international dialogue on cooperation in the region, it is only composed of the eight recognised Arctic States, does not have the sufficient authority to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and does not directly govern the actions of non-members, such as China, who are interested in expanding their presence and activities in the region. In addition, the Arctic lacks a similar multinational treaty to the one governing Antarctica, which was opened for signature in 1959 and prohibits the construction of military infrastructure or the undertaking of weapons testing. Presently, the primary governance mechanism is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). UNCLOS governs the exploitation of resources, maritime boundaries, and environmental protection. It grants an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles from the coast of each state, as well as 12 nautical miles of territorial sea. The most contested element of UNCLOS is its ruling on continental shelf rights. States are vying for extended continental shelf rights- up to 350 nautical miles from a state’s coastline, as these confer control over mineral and oil deposits, as well as any other non-living resources on or beneath the seabed. Since 2007, Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the US have all lodged claims to extended continental shelf rights, many of which have yet to be evaluated, and many of which intersect with the recognised EEZs of other Arctic states. Furthermore, the US, although it recognises UNCLOS as customary law, has not ratified the agreement, and Russia has threatened to withdraw on several occasions. This could lead to states taking their territorial claims into their own hands, to exploit the resources below the seabed and control shipping and military naval presences in the region.

2. Climate Change, Accessibility & Strategic Sea Routes

Climate change is closely tied to the rise in disputes about EEZs and extended shelf rights in the Arctic. Climate change, over the past 20 years, has transformed the Arctic region to a remarkable extent, and in doing so, has opened up a range of new economic opportunities for numerous countries. The most crucial of these opportunities are new shipping routes and access to raw materials, facilitated by the rapid melting of glaciers and ice sheets.

The Northwest Passage is one of the most vital new shipping routes, as it significantly reduces the sailing time between East and West, passing through the Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland, and the Bering Strait between the US and Russia. The Passage, although used for some shipping, is not ice-free all year round, and many interested states, including the US and Denmark, have yet to invest sufficiently in specialist icebreaker ships to utilise the passage entirely. Indeed, Denmark does not possess a single icebreaker, and the US has too few to exploit the Northwest Passage commercially. However, Russia is a global icebreaker superpower, possessing 50 in total, of which a minimum of 13 can operate in the Arctic, and seven of which are nuclear. Similarly, China has a small fleet of icebreakers- estimated to be 4- which are deployable. The possession of icebreakers extends beyond trans-Arctic shipping routes. Suppose states are to exploit the rich treasure trove of natural resources being unlocked due to the rapid rate of melting ice. In that case, these ships will be integral to accessing and securing the raw materials below, including access to minerals and fossil fuels. Even so, the cost of 

This economic competition, characterised by a scramble for resources and exclusive extraction rights, is fueling a rise in tensions between states that already possess a military presence in the Arctic, thus further deepening the military competition between states and increasing the likelihood of armed confrontation.

3. Military Presences

Far from being a barren land of glaciers, the Arctic is also home to numerous military installations, many of which are considered integral to states’ national security. The region’s strategic importance was chiefly established during the Cold War, with bases established to launch and protect against missile strikes between the US and the USSR. Since then, there has been a steady increase in the development of military installations in the region, particularly since 200,7 following Russia’s claim to the Lomonosov Ridge, located directly under the North Pole. Air defence capabilities remain an integral element of NATO’s projection into the Arctic, with the air forces of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the United Kingdom using high-north bases to scramble and intercept Russian jets heading for the Baltic.

Russia’s Arctic Posture

Russia’s extensive network of bases in and around the Arctic region is, most likely, not for offensive significance, but. Such a significant presence, centred mainly around the Peninsula, protects its economic interests, projects its influence into the region, and ensures second-strike nuclear capabilities. In particular, a defence of Russia’s North Sea Route (NSR) is in the country’s interest if its “shadow fleet” is to continue successfully circumventing Western sanctions following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, the US Department of Defence’s 2024 Arctic Strategy counters this notion, instead asserting that Russia’s increased military presence might lead to “excessive and illegal maritime claims”, particularly in areas around the Bering Strait between Russia and Alaska, as well as countering the US’s ability to project power into Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s continued cooperation with China has done nothing to abate Washington’s concerns about a potential escalation in competition.

The US, NATO and Greenland

In recent months, the US has begun to adopt a more serious approach towards the Arctic, most notably by explicitly expressing the intention to purchase Greenland and, if this is not possible, acquire the island by other means. Greenland already hosts a crucial US air base, now known as Pituffik Space Base, and, strategically, presents an ideal landmass from which to secure US and NATO control over the surrounding seas, thus preventing a projection of power by Russia and China into the waters surrounding Greenland, eastern Canada and the East Coast of the US. It could also be a precautionary measure in case Greenland attains independence from Denmark. Washington views Denmark as a weak NATO ally and Greenland as a potentially independent state, thus making it vulnerable to Chinese investment. An overture of “purchasing” the island is, therefore, a signal not so much to NATO, Greenland and Denmark as it is to the Chinese, indicating that their presence would not be tolerated on the island. In addition, it cannot be ignored that Greenland also possesses significant untapped natural resources, many of which are under threat due to the war in Ukraine and the resulting supply chain disruptions. The purchase of Greenland may, thus, not necessarily be a strictly military security measure, but also an economic possibility in terms of domestically sourcing raw materials for US domestic manufacturing. This would permit Trump to further disengage from Europe and Ukraine and to recharacterize American hemispheric security.

4. The Role of Non-Arctic States

Arctic states are not the only states interested in developing their economic and military presence in the region. Most notably, China, although it shares no border with the Arctic region and is not considered an Arctic state in any sense, has nonetheless declared itself an Arctic state, asserting the importance the region holds for the Chinese, through sailing three icebreakers through the area in July and August 2024. Experts indicate that the Arctic presents the third element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), complementing its extensive presence in Central Asia and along the Indo-Pacific sea route.

China has undertaken more frequent freedom of navigation patrols in recent years, sailing past the coasts of Alaska, Sweden and Finland, just beyond their territorial waters. However, whilst unusual for China, this action is a standard method used by many navies, including the US, to project a presence in a region without openly asserting military control. China’s Arctic White Paper, produced in 2018, makes no mention of Chinese military ambitions in the area. Its military exercises appear to be currently limited to joint air and sea patrols with Russia, and no expansion in military cooperation between the two states has been detected thus far. Instead, China has been more of an economic than a security partner to Russia in the Arctic, helping to fund fossil fuel extraction, which has been key to supporting Russia’s domestic energy production. Hostilities between China and Western states are more likely to arise from its projection of power into what NATO considers a key military region, accompanied by visibly close cooperation between China and Russia, which emphasises the idea of the Arctic as an additional front between Russia and NATO powers.

5. Dangerous Escalation Risks or Overinflated Importance?

As stated and evidenced throughout this article, the Arctic is of great significance to Arctic states and great powers, presenting opportunities for economic exploitation, resource extraction, and the projection of military power. However, it is essential to note that the discourse surrounding the Arctic is perhaps prone to overstating the immediate risk of confrontation between states, such as the US, Russia, and China, or a Russian-Chinese alliance versus NATO. In particular, Western analysis should not overestimate Chinese military ambitions in the region, nor should those interested in understanding the potential for resource exploitation underestimate the cost involved in acquiring suitable technology for the harsh challenges of the far north. Simply put, presently, the cost of expanding one’s economic and military presence in the Arctic region is too great to constitute a reshaping of the financial and military landscape in the coming few years. Nonetheless, this is not to dismiss the risks completely; however, the optics and rhetoric of Arctic competition may prove to be more dangerous than the reality on the ground, with disputes over territory and resources forming a basis for proxy confrontation in the name of other conflicts.

6. Policy Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Establishing a Dedicated Arctic Security Dialogue within the Arctic Council Framework

The Arctic Council, while vital for cooperation, lacks a formal mandate to address rising security concerns and military activities among its members and non-Arctic states. UNCLOS is insufficient for managing potential armed conflict. Arctic states should establish a dedicated security dialogue forum within the broader framework of the Arctic Council. This forum would address military transparency, de-escalation measures, and shared understandings of regional security interests. Such a forum would provide a much-needed platform for open communication between military and diplomatic representatives of Arctic states, reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. While not a binding treaty, it could foster confidence-building measures and potentially lead to informal understandings for military operations in the unique Arctic environment. It would also allow for discussions with observer states on their evolving interests. 

Recommendation 2: Establish a Dedicated Binding Arbitration Mechanism for Maritime Disputes

Arctic states, possibly in conjunction with key non-Arctic maritime powers, should negotiate and establish a specific, binding arbitration mechanism or an expanded mandate for an existing international tribunal- such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, ITLOS- to adjudicate disputes related to maritime boundaries, resource exploitation rights, and navigational freedoms in the Arctic. This mechanism should offer a clear pathway for dispute resolution beyond traditional diplomatic channels. Arctic states could perceive support from the UN. In addition, the United States should ratify UNCLOS to fully participate in and lend legitimacy to such mechanisms.

Recommendation 3: Develop Internationally Agreed Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Standards for Resource Extraction

Arctic states, under the Arctic Council's Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, should develop and agree upon a comprehensive set of international standards for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) specific to resource extraction activities in the Arctic environment. These standards should include robust requirements for baseline data collection, cumulative impact analysis, stakeholder consultation (especially with Indigenous communities), and long-term monitoring. Compliance and enforcement mechanisms, potentially involving independent oversight bodies, must also be established. Arctic Council working groups, environmental agencies of Arctic states, international scientific bodies, and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for deep-sea mining could be involved in this process. Engagement with Indigenous permanent participants of the Arctic Council is crucial for integrating traditional knowledge and ensuring that the rights of local communities are protected.