On 20 January 2021, Joe Biden became the 46th president of the United States. Throughout his campaign, he made a full 180° on the US political discourse on climate change. Positioning himself clearly on the side of science, Biden recognises climate change as the problem to be addressed, not just for the safety of the planet, but also to safeguard the leadership position of the US in key technologies for the future. In this blog, we discuss why the Biden presidency is a game changer for the cause of climate change- presenting some reasons for hope - and make some observations on the obstacles that this presidency may face on the implementation side.
The renewed US role as a climate champion
The US rejoining the Paris Agreement would represent a victory for science over the denial of evidence. With this move by the US, climate sceptic countries lost their main ally and now may be pushed to reconsider their policies. Biden’s Plan For a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice puts the fight against climate change at the centre of US foreign policy, as we can see not only from its commitment to rejoin the Paris Agreement, but also to launch a worldwide diplomatic initiative to get all countries to increase their commitment to carbon emission reduction and climate action. We had a taste of this diplomatic repositioning already during the presidential debate between Biden and Trump. We reckon Brazil may now face consequences should it not ‘stop tearing down the [Amazon rain-]forest’.
However, Biden should be ready to follow up on his threats. Brazil’s vested interest in biofuels could push for further destruction of the Amazon rainforest, as more land could be needed for feedstock. Likewise, Bolsonaro’s insistence on avoiding ‘distortions of economies that do not follow market rules’ seems to hide concerns about ongoing discussions on the opportunity of a carbon tax. Such an example leads us to fear that the US may face some strong headwinds in its efforts to rally developing countries around the cause of climate change.
Meanwhile, in China, the need to exit from international isolation; rising climate concerns; the need to meet the challenge of modern technologies and secure access to international markets for its products are driving the country towards emissions reduction. In fact, China set its own net-0 emissions target to be reached in 2060. If we look at statistics, it is clear just how important such developments are: according to 2019 data, together, the US and the EU accounted for about 22.5% of global GHG emissions, and China alone accounted for little less than 28%, with India already over 7% and on a steep rise in the last 20 years. Although longer-term than the EU-US 2050 target, the 2060 Chinese commitment is important in that it signifies that the three major emitters on the planet – among which is the greatest energy consumer – are now putting climate change and the Paris Agreement objective at the top of their agendas, and may cooperate to achieve these goals. The US vested interest in climate agreements which guarantee that major developing countries, among which the BRICS, set binding emission reduction targets thereby securing a level playing field in international markets could play a key role in increasing the pressure on China also by teaming up with the EU.
Indeed, the EU’s need to form coalitions in future climate negotiations is clear. As noted by Bäckstrand and Elgström, ‘a decrease in the EU’s aggregate power and its issue-specific power, not least in terms of the relative size of its greenhouse gas emissions, has gradually weakened the Union’s chances to promote its ambitious visions through the use of unilateral and ideational leadership’. The more the block reduces its overall contribution to global emissions, the more it will have to raise the percentage of its commitments to GHG emission cuts to keep going in the way of significant emissions reduction. As going solo becomes increasingly ineffective, the EU now seeks to steer sustainable development in third countries with other means (for example using trade agreements to promote sustainable development). In this respect, the US could help support the EU vision and put pressure on China to stop exporting emissions by funding major coal-powered plants across Asia and the world, both negotiating with the country and offering more sustainable alternatives.
Internal Dynamics
The reentering of the US in the Paris Agreement implies that it will have to set new Nationally Determined Contributions, going well beyond those made by the Obama administration to reduce GHG emissions in a range between 25 - 28% compared to 2005 levels by 2025. In order to meet this challenge, the Biden plan for a Clean Energy Revolution envisages a wide set of measures and bold investments of 1.7 Trillion $. This massive investment plan covers the research and development of 0-carbon technologies made in the USA, carbon-capture technologies, batteries, small nuclear power plants, offshore-wind platforms, and indeed renewed external action efforts to rally third countries around the climate cause. This vision and investment is further articulated in the plan for a Clean Energy Future which envisions: full electrification of the transport sector by 2035, investing heavily in railways, a renovation wave of public infrastructure and buildings to make them climate-proven and resilient, green financing schemes and more. It is worth stressing that part of the money necessary for the clean energy revolution will come from divesting in Trump’s projects such as the wall with Mexico and a new oil pipeline project that was to bring oil to the US from Canada. Some elements suggest that indeed, the plan stands a chance of being implemented. The president is pushing the Congress to approve an enforcement mechanism by the end of his first term, aimed at holding big polluters accountable, to guarantee that the country stays on the sustainable path even beyond the span of his mandate. Within the US, there are industries that chose to stick to the Paris Agreement objectives in spite of the position of the White House. Even more importantly, a growing number of States are joining California in the US Climate Alliance, while leading personalities and regional organisations within the US are advocating for climate action at a lower level, mobilising civil society, industry, and national and local authorities. A supportive counterpart at the federal level sets the scene for quicker and wider progress.
However, although the Democrats won the Senate (by one vote), thereby securing a Democratic majority in the Congress, there are still many obstacles in the way of a secure path for Biden’s agenda through the Congress. Although his majority should make it easier for Biden to promote climate laws than it had been for Obama in the runup to the Paris Agreement (and less easy for the next Republican administration to revert the progress that will be made by this government) the Democrats are far from the secure majority of 60 senators needed to speed up the process. Indeed, such is the number to reach if one wants to close a parliamentary discussion and prevent the opposition from filibustering. This means that the Democrats will often have to seek compromise with the moderate wing of the Republicans to be able to move forward.
Acknowledging this situation, Renee Cho, from the Earth Institute of Columbia University, argues Biden could move forward on climate in three ways. First, simply avoid pursuing those actions still in the pipeline of the previous administration. Second, for the Trump attempted rollbacks which are currently being challenged in court but are still in early stages, the Department of Justice under Biden could go to the responsible court and ask to have the case put on hold until the law is revised in such a manner as to render Trump’s reversal clearly unlawful and fill regulatory gaps left by the previous version. Finally, to counter any rollbacks of Obama’s legislation that have already been finalised Biden will have to start a new legislative process all over again. A congressional representative will have to come forth with a legislative proposal that should be discussed, engage in a public consultation with stakeholders, review and integrate proposed amendments and table a final proposal to be voted by the Congress. This is by far the longest and most intricate process, especially because it may face filibustering in the Senate. An effective and quick way around this is the already tested issuing of executive orders: giving new directions to Federal Agencies on how to implement existing legislation. However, such acts are not secure in the mid-to-long term, as they can easily be undone by the next republican administration, just as Biden is now doing.
Given the increasing pressures from the industry and civil society within the US, bipartisan coalitions may emerge in congress to back up future environmental Acts that would prevent the risk of filibustering and steer the implementation of the ambitious Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we maintain that having the Biden presidency teaming up with the EU in future climate negotiations, not just the upcoming COP 26 next November but also in the context of a US global diplomatic effort to encourage the entire world to go for more ambitious climate commitments, will be crucial to give a new momentum to the global reaction to climate change, especially vis-a-vis China, Brazil and other major developing countries. The full diplomatic weight of the US and of John Kerry, the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, who already successfully negotiated the Paris Agreement as the top US diplomat, may help secure broad climate coalitions. However, even if China, India, and all the other developing countries should not follow the EU in its sustained effort for decarbonisation and emissions reduction, the contribution to global GHG emissions of these two blocks put together means that there is scope for significantly cutting GHG global emissions. Moreover, with the largest and most dynamic markets in the world pushing for higher standards, there is room for hoping that developing countries will have to accelerate their progress towards more efficient and climate-proved growth models, if not to remain competitive in international markets and safeguard access for their products to such markets.
However, the credibility of the US as a Climate Champion in the international arena will be influenced by its capacity to deliver on its climate revolution at home. This rests on the ability of the Democrats to build up coalitions with the moderate wing of the Republicans, and on the readiness of US Member States and civil society to mobilise all economic, political and social resources to implement the change. If the battle for climate change is to be won, we need the US to buy into it long-term, so that progress made in the next years is not rolled back by the next climate sceptic.
Comments