The recent engagements between China and Africa, as well as China’s expanding presence on the global market have provoked polarising debates on the nature of China’s complicity with African states. In fact, there have been three main strands of thought characterising China’s presence in Africa; China is viewed as an economic competitor, a crucial development partner, and as a coloniser. This article will examine the nature of China’s involvement in African states, particularly in the sector of infrastructure, before addressing the drawbacks of this involvement and speculations of neo-colonialist tendencies.
Rapid Urbanisation Across the African Continent
As the African continent has experienced some of the fastest rates of urbanisation in the world, it has effectively become the last stepping stone of the world’s Fourth Industrial Revolution. Sub-Saharan cities have experienced substantial annual growth rates, with some African cities accounting for over three quarters of populations. By 2050, Africa’s current 1.1 billion population is expected to double, with 80% of that growth happening in cities. In Lagos alone, for example, the population is increasing at a rate of 77 people per hour.
However, these urbanisation rates have often been associated with the increasing number of slums, urban violence, poverty and inequality. Rising urban populations have also meant a notable strain on natural resources and the environment around them. Some policy responses to the increasing urbanisation rates have been the development of infrastructures and services targeted at marginalised groups, the mobilisation of urban financing from investors, and the diversification of economic activities (African Development Bank Group, 2012).
The rapid transition from rural to urban settings has challenged most African countries, while also rewarding the countries willing to invest billions in the development of infrastructure. In turn, this has caught the attention of investors like China that see African countries’ investment needs as an opportunity to execute their own agendas. In recent years, the Chinese construction industry has become increasingly competitive: agencies such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank have published public data that has allowed researchers to estimate the share of contract value going to Chinese firms funding projects in different sectors of the market (IDE-JETRO Report on China in Africa, 2009). Consequently, this has helped these agencies understand just how competitive Chinese construction firms really are. A staggering 70% of the value of contracts won by Chinese firms under multilateral projects was accounted for by just 4 African countries: Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia and the DRC.
While an increase in investments may positively impact the infrastructure of several African countries, in the long run, these investments pose significant risks and challenges. Nations such as Djibouti and Tanzania have grown concerned over whether or not they will be able to generate enough economic activity to repay Chinese loans, and whether these infrastructure projects will be profitable in the long run.
What’s in it for China?
When the Communist Party of China took power in 1949, its sovereignty was mostly only recognised by communist states, whereas most countries favoured China’s former government that had been exiled to Taiwan. In an effort to get the People’s Republic recognised in the second half of the 20th century, China focused its resources on gaining political support throughout the world. Sino-African political commitments were often repaid by China through the building of railroads, education hubs and hospitals throughout the continent. For example, African states have supported blockings of UN resolutions condemning Chinese violations of Tibetan’s rights, deflecting any possible sanctions for the communist state. In return, China has consistently enabled illiberal African regimes and funded important construction projects such as mining and telecommunications infrastructures in the Central African Republic under Bozize’s dictatorial regime (2003).
But political alliances weren’t the only thing that pushed China to create partnerships with African countries; with the colonial powers having left the continent, African countries were still stockpiles of natural resources. Beijing wasted no time making the most of the post-colonial power vacuum, laying the political and economic foundations that have helped the country impose its presence throughout the continent today. For example, China has thwarted itself into the offshore oil industry and oil producing countries like Angola and Nigeria (IDE-JETRO Report on China in Africa, 2009). In the last decade, Xi Jinping has even ventured into higher-risk countries such as Chad and Sudan in order to establish joint ventures with state owned oil companies and remain close to political decision makers in the oil industry and energy sector.
China has become Africa’s primary trade partner, with trade between them topping $200 billion every year. It was even estimated that over 10,000 Chinese firms are presently operating around the continent, with Africa replacing Asia as the principal market for Chinese overseas construction contracts. With China’s unprecedented economic growth and a rapidly expanding middle class, it is no surprise that Xi Jinping has focused on securing raw materials and oil supplies all over the world. Although Africa is not usually attractive to foreign investments due to political instability and high security risks, over the last decades, China has invigorated the Angolan and Nigerian oil and mining sectors in exchange for favourable trade deals. In essence, China needs what Africa has in order to secure long-term political and economic stability. For example, over 30% of China’s oil and a fourth of its cotton is supplied by African countries.
The Belt and Road Initiative vs Africa’s infrastructure needs
Announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative aimed to reshape China’s global engagements and restore China as a major world power. In order to materialise this vision, Xi’s plan included the construction of vast networks of railways, pipelines, border crossings and highways. As such, this network would increase Asian connectivity and expand the international use of Chinese currency. At a speech marking the 5th anniversary of the BRI, Xi Jinping explained that the initiative serves as a solution for China to improve global economic governance, promote common development and prosperity, and build a community for a shared future in humanity. Based on targeted investments and sectors, it is clear that the strategy followed by Beijing aims at fulfilling China’s resource needs. The revival of ancient trade routes from China’s Silk Road linking China to East Africa has been used by Beijing to prove its commitment to the continent. According to Xi, African countries can only benefit from the Belt and Road initiative; as he explains, “inadequate infrastructure is the biggest bottleneck to Africa’s development”.
Many African leaders have shared their support for the initiative, hopeful for prospective byproducts that would increase Chinese investments in agriculture, real estate or even tourism in addition to their infrastructure projects. With African countries counting up to $100 billion short per year for their infrastructure needs, China has seen an opportunity in the African countries’ requirement for loans. A recent study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2018 on China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade and investment landscape found that if the BRI projects are used productively, then East Africa’s exports could possibly increase by almost $200 million every year.
Rising concerns over power asymmetry and neocolonialism
During the first half of the 20th century, European powers claimed they funded infrastructure projects throughout Africa in order to boost local economic development, but they were essentially used to extract natural resources. Today, many scholars who view China’s involvement as negative have explained that there is in fact “power asymmetry” between the economic superpower and the politically vulnerable African states (Wan Yan Chan, 2018). The term “neo-colonialism” has often been used to discuss Sino-African power dynamics; it has been defined as the “diminution of African states’ sovereignty through asymmetric economic relations and inequitable trade and investment between parties. In addition, there have also been parallels drawn between present day Chinese activities throughout African states and the activities of former colonial powers involved in the continent. Wan Yan Chan underlines that the combination of trade, financial investments and exports of raw materials to China does resemble the exploitative behaviour of Western colonial powers. Indeed, the economic pragmatism exerted by China and Beijing’s complicity with local political elites does highlight some valid doubts about the neocolonialist character of Sino-African relations.
By pushing African countries to achieve their ambitions of a stronger economic future, China has also pushed these countries into tremendous infrastructure-induced debt that they cannot realistically afford. For example, a study by Forbes demonstrates that the $4 billion Addis Ababa to Djibouti Railway turned out to cost Ethiopia nearly 25% of its 2016 budget. Furthermore, Kenya’s Chinese-funded railway from Nairobi to Mombasa has quadrupled in budget, costing the country over 5% of its GDP. In 2013, the governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank played into anti-Chinese sentiment by explaining that “Africa must recognise that China—like the U.S., Russia, Britain, Brazil and the rest—is in Africa not for African interests but its own.”
In addition to raising concerns about the creation of debt traps throughout the African continent, China’s infrastructure projects have provoked controversy about other grievances, such as poor compliance with safety or environmental standards, violations of local laws, and unfair labour practices. African workers have begun voicing their disapproval of certain Chinese companies’ wages and working conditions, and international NGOs have also highlighted environmental concerns. Many organisations reproach China’s lack of resource transparency and slim efforts to guarantee environmental and animal protection.
Conclusions and recommendations: How can Africa’s interests be protected?
Can African countries mitigate the menaces inherent in the Belt and Road Initiative, and make the most out of China-funded infrastructure? For this to be possible, accountability and transparency are needed in all Belt and Road Initiative negotiations. By making these more transparent and allowing for scrutiny, oversight bodies such as parliaments can diligently monitor all negotiations, and keep the African and Chinese public informed, along with other nations in the liberal international order. China is sensitive to how African nations and the rest of the world perceive it, and, when the public is watchful and critical, it is more likely to be responsive and adhere to local demands and regulations.
In addition, African states should be encouraged to implement better governance and uphold regulation on all Chinese businesses operating throughout the continent. It is crucial that African civilians keep Chinese contracts in check to enforce compliance with their respective governments. Indeed, China does display neocolonialist tendencies that could potentially undermine African states’ sovereignty, but its investments throughout the continent have also immensely benefited African economy and infrastructure. Over the next decade, China’s influence on the African continent will inevitably grow, and China will undoubtedly continue to advance its own national interest. If African nations explored a new development model focused on innovation and human capital, they could use Chinese networks of free trade zones, human resources and infrastructure a lot more effectively. Fundamentally, African nations need to better governance capacity and increase civic engagement in order to oversee external influences and profit from international investments.
It is clear that the BRI can positively benefit African countries, but these benefits rely on a China-Africa relationship that is a lot more equal than today. If China’s geopolitical project is aimed mainly at advancing China’s position as a world superpower, it is critical that African countries establish where their interests converge and diverge with China’s, and how these convergences can be structured to advance African development needs. If the continent comes up nearly $100 billion short every year in infrastructure investments, it is critical to adopt business friendly approaches such as containing corruption and cutting down regulatory hurdles that impede it from attaining a win-win scenario with China.
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