In the face of a worsening economic crisis and increasing governmental leadership failures, gangs in Venezuela have started filling the power vacuum, ruthlessly evolving into the true rulers of the country’s streets. Once favoured as loyal supporters of Chávez’ party, the PSUV, these groups have now imposed their own systems, threatening the already unstable political status quo and the future of Venezuela’s re-democratisation process.
During the first week of July 2021, Caracas experienced one of the most violent altercations between gangs and the official police forces in Venezuela, mainly led by the Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC). An armed ‘mega-gang’, allegedly led by a man known by the alias El Koki, invaded residential areas in the Western part of Caracas. Official information indicated that there were at least 4 police deaths and 22 deaths on the gang’s side, although other sources estimate a higher death toll. Carmen Meléndez, Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace, further declared that there were 33 detentions, amongst which they allegedly found Colombian paramilitary members.
Carmen Meléndez (@gestionperfecta) on Twitter:
“The Gran Cacique Guaicaipuro operation has contemplated a wide deployment, which has allowed the liberation of different sectors of the affected parishes in Caracas, as well as the capture of 33 delinquents, three of them Colombian Paramilitaries”
El Koki’s mega-gang currently controls the South-East of the capital city, including access to roads that lead to strategic points, such as the Simon Bolivar National Airport. Given the increasing power these groups are gathering, sometimes endorsed by the government itself, gang violence is not unprecedented in the country. The incident is just another escalation of the ever-growing circle of violence in Venezuela. In fact, some people living in the slums, or barrios, where most of these gangs operate see them as protectors–a somewhat necessary evil.
“It is a complicated reality. People say ‘I don’t like the malandro, but they help me” Said Wilfredo in Caracas in a BBC news report.
These gangs and mega-gangs often display loose hierarchical structures based on accumulated respect, and have access to resources and territories. As a result, many of these gangs no longer obey the superior command of a bigger ally such as a government or an organisation, and have now become the rulers instead. Some are now being pursued by the Maduro government, with a bounty adding up to USD 500,000 per capture. For reference, the current minimum salary in Venezuela barely adds to USD 2.5 per month.
These groups have become harder to eradicate, since they even control spaces such as prisons. Politicians can no longer ignore the political influence these gangs will have in any re-building attempts of Venezuela. Facing imminent violent opposition if there is disagreement from these groups, no party is safe from the threat of criminal gangs. To understand the implications of such criminal circles in a country with a weak democratic system, it is vital to understand how violence became normalised in the Venezuelan political arena.
How violent groups turned into politicians
After years of conflict and dictatorship, Venezuela enjoyed relative political peace by the beginning of the seventies. This new political status quo allowed the creation of more extreme left-wing parties. One of them was the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR). Initially called MBR-200, the group secretly commenced operations in the 1980s when a then-young military officer, Hugo Chávez, decided to create a movement with fellow colleagues that “rejected democracy, endorsed policies based on Chávez’s interpretation of the philosophy of Simón Bolívar [...], and sometimes advocated violence to overthrow the existing political order.”
After gaining sympathy from the poorer sectors of society, the former paramilitary and anti-system Chávez democratically became Venezuela’s President in 1999, somewhat validating violence, militarisation, and more extreme forms of politics to gain power.
Murals depicting Chávez as a military leader are not uncommon across the country. Source: La Stampa
Considering how Chávez became President, it is unsurprising that he used his platform to promote behaviours and policies that encouraged violence both directly and indirectly. Now in government, his policies would promote these activities to remain in power and legitimise his rule, including the creation of armed civilian groups.
Chavismo and armed civilians: The colectivos
Two main groups were created to form a civil-military alliance: militias, which would become part of the armed forces, and colectivos, which emerged from the Chavismo-created commune structures mainly inside the barrios. Both groups shared a similar interest: preserving Chávez’s government and ideology by turning civilians into defenders of the Revolución.
The colectivos were less institutionally integrated than the militias, but had a wider range of legal activities under the protection of the communal system. The colectivos initially intended to conduct social activities supported by the State, but investigations indicate that an armed and illegal version of colectivos took advantage of this system and initiated criminal activities inside their territories, using Chávez’s orders as their alibi. For instance, a colectivo group, the Tupamaro, is accused of using weapons to intimidate and confront other groups, yet they have an official political party.
Armed colectivos patrol the streets in Caracas. Source: Cadena SER
Chavismo has notoriously used these groups for defence. In past elections, they have organised group attacks to intimidate opposition voters and leaders. These heavily armed civilians are not isolated from the military system, nor have they denied their participation in some of the biggest human rights violations seen during the 2014, 2017, and 2019 opposition protests.
Although it is hard to have full numbers, Human Rights Watch has estimated that out of 124 deaths during the 2017 protests, at least 46 were caused by the security forces, at least 27 by colectivos, and 51 are unknown.
Eventually, the colectivos challenged the system itself, sometimes directly confronting Chavista politicians. The structure that allowed them to become this powerful also enabled the strengthening of criminal gangs, which operated in similar settings and socioeconomic conditions. Clashes were inevitable and, especially under the Maduro government, no longer isolated enough to ignore.
Losing control: OLPs and mega gangs
After Chávez died in 2013, the rhetoric towards criminality shifted under Maduro: from a social approach to a punitive one. In sum, criminals, formerly seen as a consequence of social injustice and poverty, became allies of the anti-government system and a proof of a societal value-loss. For Maduro, this justified police action and more aggressive measures.
A result was what are now termed the OLPs (The Peoples’ Liberation Operations, in Spanish). Before creating them in 2015, Maduro’s government had tried establishing ‘Peace Zones’, slum areas where police forces would not enter under the promise that gangs would cease criminal activity and weapon use. The plan failed, as it solidified those gangs’ power by giving them status and freedom to roam and proliferate inside their territories.
Only two years after their creation, some investigations estimated at least 560 assassinations in 44 massacres under the OLP project. These operations proved threatening to the already strong gangs from both former peace and non-peace zones, pushing their leaders to encourage alliances, resulting in what are known today as ‘mega-gangs’.
Such alliances add more complexity, and these gangs, now big enough to enact change but too disorganised to seek concrete political reforms, represent a major setback to any attempts to alter the status quo. Today, the gangs have reservations about the Maduro government, but do not relate to the opposition, yet their power could translate into violence should any actor try to end it.
The Present: The Eye of a Political Storm.
The international community has focused on the executive aspect of the Venezuelan crisis. This emphasis on legitimacy of elected leaders omits the increasing importance of armed groups in the slums of the country.
The lack of strong leadership has solidified the power these groups hold over their populations and territories. Gangs are treated inconsistently, sometimes as criminal gangs, sometimes as paramilitary groups, or simply individuals that come together with a similar goal. The State apparatus has pushed media and police forces to address these events in isolation, but gang activities are far from isolated. For instance, El Koki’s gang operates just 45 kilometers away from Miraflores, the presidential palace, and barrio residents have previously expressed their dislike towards the current Maduro regime (although this does not translate into support for the opposition).
The colectivos were once the main governmental weapon against insurrection, using armed civilians to stop any dissident attempts. Now, gangs themselves are proving to be a sufficiently strong contender. Mega-gangs have weapons, territorial control, sometimes local support, and access to resources to keep their communities safe as long as they follow the gang’s rules. Without a defined political interest, as they are not directly supported by the State, these groups must not be considered as isolated actors of violence, but rather as organised armed or paramilitary groups.
The gangs are notorious for recruiting young people and paying USD 50 to 100 for different jobs. This reflects the current Venezuelan situation, and demonstrates the challenges any government will face should they try to re-establish democracy in Venezuela. The gangs, often providers of their communities, have accumulated power, weapons, money, and loyalty, something the Maduro government and the opposition have not been able to consistently monopolise.
The barrios are a relevant actor of Venezuelan society, often housing the leaders of the mega-gangs. Negotiations with these groups are near impossible, since there is no ‘big leader’ and their activities do not pursue political reform. Still, it is clear that Venezuela lacks a strong institutional system to control the gangs, even less if they truly insurrect. Additionally, negotiations with these groups could give them more power and relevance, as previously experienced during the peace-zone attempts. Pandering to these groups is not an option either, as validating their activities would further weaken the fragile institutional system. Given the current conditions of Venezuela, it is vital to start proposing solutions to address this worsening dilemma.
Breaking gang politics in Venezuela
The international community should recognise and classify Venezuelan street gangs formally as ‘Armed Groups’ or ‘Paramilitary Groups’. A formal approach to these groups allows the use of existing training materials for disarmament. Simultaneously, the Maduro government or future governments should be urged to disarm and dismantle the current illegal branches of colectivos, allowing only the ones that work for social causes. This would contribute to the reduction of human rights violations and the re-establishment democratic order.
Stopping a decades-old system is not a straightforward process. Venezuela has become one of the most violent countries in the world. The priority should be to limit human rights violations and aggressions from both colectivos and street gangs. Efficient and solid monitoring tools are vital. These would also enable structures to target the societal grievances that divided different social classes in the country, using transitional justice and peacebuilding concepts as core inspirations. However, these groups do not exist in isolation. Venezuela must address corruption before considering accountability for criminal gangs. A system must be established to thoroughly investigate the accusations of violations by officials inside the legal State-armed forces and police officials. This particular suggestion will pose an enormous challenge to the current political actors, as many politicians have benefitted from corruption in their mandates. Still, an agreement can be made about re-evaluating the effectiveness of ‘Peace Zones’ and other projects, designing a new method to start a pacification process of the population.
Venezuela has become a country where violence is an everyday element of political control. Classic negotiation methods are obsolete when implemented in the heavily eroded social circuits of the country. As such, the future of democracy in Venezuela relies on considering non-formal political actors as a central point of discussion when designing any recovery plan. Although the eradication of gangs remains a priority, the reasons why people join them are deeply influenced by socio-economic factors. As long as there are socio-economic grievances, there will be a risk of relapse in a country that has not seen change in more than two decades. Meanwhile, Venezuelans either escape or stay, hoping for change and a better future.
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